MORE INTELLIGENT DESIGN:
TESTING MEASURES OF MERIT
Kimberly West-Faulcon
This Article articulates the theoretical, legal, and policy implications of new and improved theories
of intelligence and recent research finding that conventional mass-marketed standardized tests, or
“factorist tests,” have less predictive power and larger racial differences in scores than newer multidimensional “systems-based” tests. It raises a new question about the fairness of the role that
traditional admissions tests like the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT currently play in selective
higher education admissions—whether basing admissions on scores on such tests unfairly distorts
the true admissions-related merit of individual applicants and racial groups. The core of this
argument is not that selective universities rely on a flawed definition of merit or that traditional
factorist tests are racially, economically, or culturally biased. Instead, this Article considers the
ramifications of social science evidence suggesting that the admissions tests most commonly relied
upon today are less successful in predicting applicants’ future academic performance and have
more racially skewed scores because they are designed according to a scientifically flawed theory of
intelligence. It argues that this analysis is particularly salient in light of recent scientific studies,
such as one finding that the currently dominant factorist college admissions test—the SAT—
produces significantly larger racial group differences in test scores but with only half the predictive
power of a newly designed “more intelligent” college admissions test—a new test based on the
theory that intelligence is broadly comprised of more aspects and components than the general
intelligence factor “g.” Acknowledging that the predictive power of mental tests is inherently
limited—even a mental test designed according to a perfectly accurate theory of intelligence could
not fully explain differences in individuals’ future academic performance, this Article posits that
the ramifications of using outmoded and theoretically flawed standardized tests warrant legal
examination and necessitate an interdisciplinary endeavor to delineate the framework for such
legal analysis. As such, the Article interrogates the prevailing view that comparing applicants’
scores on conventional factorist tests affords each applicant the opportunity to be judged fairly
according to his or her individual merit. The Article posits that universities that rely on
conventional admissions test like the SAT are potentially vulnerable to the policy criticism that
reliance on factorist tests like the SAT is anti-meritocratic—it rewards applicants based on a
theoretically flawed and inferior tool for measuring admissions-related merit. In addition, two
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potential legal implications flow from this Article’s analysis. First, scientific research that reveals
that factorist tests have less predictive power but larger racial differences makes universities that
rely on such tests vulnerable to Title VI disparate impact administrative complaints. Second, the
scientific “test deficiency” of factorist standardized tests provides an alternative or corollary to the
diversity rationale for race-consciousness in selective admissions recognized by the Suprme Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence—a new “test deficiency” rationale for
affirmative action. Correcting for the demonstrated tendency of factorist tests to make individually
and racially skewed errors in assessing the admissions-related merit of applicants is meritocratic,
fair, legal, and, in certain circumstances, legally required.
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INTRODUCTION
Just as new knowledge in metallurgy, electronics, and biochemistry has led to “long-lasting” razor blades, color television, and new
1
medications and vaccines, “psychometrics” —the psychological study
of how to measure mental ability—has produced mental tests such as
2
the SAT, Law School Admissions Test (“LSAT”), Graduate Records
Examination (“GRE”), and Medical College Admissions Test
3
(“MCAT”). Since the turn of the twentieth century, psychometric
theories as to how individuals differ in mental ability and how such
differences can be measured have impacted legal and lay perceptions
of what it means to judge applicants to elite higher education on “individual merit.” This Article asserts that modern social science re-

1

2

3

The term “psychometrician” refers to the practitioners of the mathematical operation
called “factor analysis.” See, e.g., Human Intelligence, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/289766/human-intelligence (last visited May 11,
2011).
Originally called the Scholastic Aptitude Test, “SAT” no longer has an official meaning.
TONY MONCHINSKI, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND THE EVERYDAY CLASSROOM 171 (2008) (observing that the acronym SAT once stood for “scholastic aptitude test” and later “scholastic
assessment test” but that “[q]uestions of what the SAT supposedly assessed led to the jettisoning of that acronym and today the initials SAT stand for nothing”) (emphasis in original). This Article uses “SAT” to refer to the current SAT Reasoning Test, formerly named
the SAT I: Reasoning Test. See Frequently Asked Questions, CollegeBoard.com, http://
sat.collegeboard.com/about-tests/sat/FAQ (last visited May 11, 2011).
Psychologist John Carroll first drew this analogy. See John B. Carroll, The Measurement of
Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 29, 29 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1982)
(discussing the development of mental tests and the correlation between scores on intelligence quotient (“IQ”) tests and other standardized admissions tests). In using the term
“mental tests,” I mean to refer to tests of abstract reasoning, IQ tests, and undergraduate
and graduate admissions tests like the SAT, LSAT, GRE, and MCAT. There are substantial similarities and high correlations in scores when “IQ-type” tests and college admissions tests like the SAT are compared.
Most intelligence tests are similar in many ways to tests of academic accomplishment,
such as the SAT, and they are often mistaken for one another. This is in part because the
two types of tests—intelligence tests and achievement tests—commonly feature time limits and multiple-choice questions. See ANNA T. CIANCIOLO & ROBERT J. STERNBERG,
INTELLIGENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY 31 (2004) (“Realistically speaking, all tests of mental ability—whether they are intelligence tests or achievement tests—measure both intellectual
aptitude and the outcomes of learning.”).
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search focused on how to better define and measure intelligence
challenges, the amount of value and reliance placed on conventional
versions of such tests, both in terms of how well they measure intelligence, and how accurate they are in predicting success in higher
4
education. This assertion has theoretical, as well as practical, legal,
5
and policy, implications. This Article’s focus is the significance of
innovation in intelligence theory and test development over the past
few decades that has resulted in the creation of “more intelligent”
6
standardized tests —tests that do a better job of predicting test-takers’
future academic performance—when compared to the conventional
educational admissions tests like the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT

4

5

6

Although the Educational Testing Service (“ETS”) has gone to great lengths to disassociate the admissions tests it designs and administers—the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT—
from IQ tests like the Stanford-Binet, intelligence testing experts consider the SAT and its
graduate school-level counterparts to be highly “g-loaded.” See, e.g., Richard C. Atkinson
& Saul Geiser, Reflections on a Century of College Admissions Tests, 38 EDUC. RESEARCHER 665,
666 (2009) (asserting that “the one constant has been the SAT’s claim to gauge students’
general analytic ability, as distinct from their mastery of specific subject matter”); Linda S.
Gottfredson & James Crouse, Validity Versus Utility of Mental Tests: Example of the SAT, 29 J.
OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 363, 365–66 (1986) (arguing that SAT and other ETS tests are
likely good measures of “g”); see also Meredith C. Frey & Douglas K. Detterman, Scholastic
Assessment or g?: The Relationship Between the Scholastic Assessment Test and General Cognitive
Ability, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 373, 377 (2004) (“[T]he SAT is an adequate measure of general
intelligence . . . .”).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits federally funded universities from excluding applicants on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). The current Court has
interpreted Title VI itself to prohibit only disparate treatment discrimination. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative Action
Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1123 (2009) (“[N]o private right of action exists to enforce
Title VI disparate impact regulations.”). The U.S. Department of Education regulations
implementing Title VI prohibit federally funded educational institutions from using selection criteria that have an unjustified racially discriminatory effect. Id. at 1122–23 (“A
violation of Title VI regulations does not require proof of purposeful discrimination.”).
Rejected applicants cannot sue universities for alleged Title VI disparate impact violations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that “no such right of
action exists”). However, individuals may file complaints with the U.S. Department of
Education Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) alleging such violations. The OCR and DOJ have authority to investigate potential violations of Title VI and to terminate federal funding to educational institutions found to be
in violation of Title VI disparate impact regulations. See Investigation Procedures Manual for
the Investgiation and Resolution of Complaints Alleging Violations of Title VI and Other Nondiscrimination Statutes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/cor/Pubs/manuals/complain.pdf. The DOJ may also file suit against
universities to prove Title VI violations. See Title VI Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
104–05 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/
vimanual.pdf.
I have applied a similar analysis to innovations in employment testing. See generally Kimberly West-Faulcon, Fairness Feuds: Title VII’s Competing Conceptions of Discriminatory Testing,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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that currently dominate selective college and graduate school admissions.
This Article is an interdisciplinary project that considers the implications of technological advances in mental measurement in the
context of selective higher education admissions. To do so, it assumes that the goal of American selective universities is to distribute
the valuable social and economic good of elite higher education ac7
cording to a “traditional liberal conception of merit.” Next, it suggests that newly developed intelligence theories and mental tests call
into question the conventional wisdom that selecting the highest
scorers on conventional factorist tests like the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and
MCAT constitutes “meritocratic” selection.
The standardized admissions tests used by most selective universities, like the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT, are based on the mathe8
9
matically driven “factorist” view of intelligence. Factorist theories of
intelligence conceive a general mental energy—the “g” general intelli-

7

8

9

The traditional liberal conception of merit I presume throughout is essentially the “liberal equality” conception that applicants should be selected based on a combination of
“natural talent” and “conscientious effort.” See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73
(1971) (describing and rejecting the liberal interpretation of the second principle of justice as “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness
to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in
the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born”).
Rawls rejects liberal equality because he concludes that “the initial endowment of natural
assets and contingencies of their growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a
moral point of view.” Id. at 311–12. Justifying or critiquing the liberal conception is
beyond the scope of this Article. I will note my agreement with Rawls’s conclusion that
“the effort a person is willing to make” as well as their “natural talents” are morally arbitrary: they do not correlate to moral. See id. Here, my focus is assessing whether selective
universities’ traditional admissions policies are consistent with that conception. Accordingly, this Article starts from the position that America’s elite public and private universities have adopted a meritocracy ideology that seeks to use objective and unbiased criteria to compare and select applicants.
This Article uses the term “factorist” to refer to tests and theories of intelligence derived
from defining intelligence according to its structure as revealed by the mathematical
technique of “factor analysis.” Factor analysis is a mathematical operation used in a wide
variety of academic fields to test or confirm commonalities in data. See, e.g., DENNIS
CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2006). The common attribute of factorist theories of intelligence is the centrality of “g”—the “general intelligence factor.” To
“g” theorists, the “g” general factor is “the factor common to all problem-solving abilities.”
PAUL KLINE, INTELLIGENCE: THE PSYCHOMETRIC VIEW 3 (1991).
In this Article, I use the phrase “factorist tests” and “factorist theories” to refer to psychological tests and theories derived by factor analysis of mental test scores to conclude that
intelligence is best conceived as the “g” general factor, a concept first introduced in the
early 1900s by the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. Modern psychometric
views of intelligence ascribe to a modernized version of Spearman’s g-based theory. See
infra Part II.A.
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10

gence factor” —that is fixed during adulthood and constitutes the
most significant aspect of intelligence.
Traditional factorist admissions tests do a better job of predicting
which test-takers will succeed academically than would be possible if
mental tests did not exist at all; the correlation between scores on
such tests and post-admission early grades has been shown to be sta11
tistically significant.
However, that correlation is not necessarily
12
substantively significant. Even though factorist tests do provide some
predictive information, they also leave a lot of the differences in testtakers’ future academic success in college and graduate school unex13
plained. This means that the overall predictive power of factorist
14
tests leaves substantial room for innovation and improvement.
The focus of this Article is new intelligence research that posits
that flaws in the g-based theory of intelligence may explain why goriented tests are useful but still weak predictors of future academic
15
performance. Theorists who have posited alternatives to the g-based
10

11

12
13

14

15



This is the scientific theory that intelligence is equated to a single “general ability” called
the “general intelligence factor” or “general factor” (“g”) that is common to solving problems on all tests of mental ability. See Arthur R. Jensen, Spearman’s g: Links Between Psychometrics and Biology, in BRAIN MECHANISMS: PAPERS IN MEMORY OF ROBERT THOMPSON
103, 103 (Francis M. Crinella & Jen Yu eds., 1993) (“g refers to the component of individual differences variance that is common to all tests of mental ability.”). g has also been
defined as the ability to take mental tests. See, e.g., KLINE supra note 8, at 3–4 (“Since the
best intelligence tests are deliberately constructed to measure this g factor it does make
sense to define intelligence as what intelligence tests measure, provided that the g factor
can be specified.”).
See Richard Lempert, The Significance of Statistical Significance: Two Authors Restate an Incontrovertible Caution. Why A Book?, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 225, 226 (2009) (“The caution: Statistical significance is not the same as substantive significance. Statistically significant relationships may, and often do, tell us nothing that matters, while relationships that do not
achieve conventional levels of statistical significance can be important, and we may neglect them at our peril.”).
See id.
If factorist test scores were the only information available about a set of applicants, admission based on test scores would result in the selection of more academically successful
applicants than random selection. See infra Part II.B.
The arrays of test questions, answer formats, and predictive power of current factorist
tests remain, for the most part, quite similar to their early mental testing forbearers. See,
e.g., Carroll, supra note 3.
Modern intelligence research suggests factorist tests are like the traditional head-on frontal collision tests adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”) nearly thirty years ago; they only partially explain the differences in future
outcomes society wants explained as compared to new and more useful tests. See Ronald
Montoya, NHTSA Revises Five-Star Safety Ratings, EDMUND’S.COM (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.edmunds.com/car-safety/nhtsa-revises-five-star-safety-ratings.phtml (describing the inclusion of the new tests as “one of the biggest changes since safety testing was
first conducted in 1978” along with a recognition of models with new crash avoidance
technology features, such as electronic stability control, lane-departure warning systems
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theory of intelligence and alternatives to g-based tests contend their
new “multi-dimensional” approaches to defining intelligence and
mental measurement are more predictive of test-takers’ future aca16
demic performance than traditional g-based factorist tests. This Article considers whether this particular research calls into question the
fairness of the role that factorist tests currently play in admission to
America’s most selective colleges and universities.
Although the central examination of this Article—the implications of scientific innovation in the capacity of mental tests to measure test-takers’ admissions-related merit—is not about race or race
discrimination, the modern intelligence research that is its focus has
racial implications. Numerous studies show that newly designed tests
are not just more valid and predictive than traditional factorist tests,
but this research also suggests that differences in racial group average
scores are smaller on tests based on more complete theories of intelligence (multi-dimensional conceptions of intelligence) than on factorist tests. Such findings—essentially that at least some portion of
the racial differences in factorist test scores are attributable to inadequacies in factorist tests as predictors of future academic success—
have significant legal and policy implications related to race and selective higher education admissions.
Specifically, scientific evidence that “more intelligent” tests have
smaller racial differences in scores shifts the legal terrain in conflicts
involving race and testing. Research demonstrates that the predictive
inadequacies of, and scientifically unjustified racial differences in,
scores on conventional factorist tests like the SAT may be legally cog17
nizable “test deficiencies.” Here, I suggest that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence and Title VI disparate impact
standards are structured to recognize the concept of test deficiency
that is the focus of this Article. Scientific evidence that factorist admissions tests have larger racial differences in scores than newly designed tests could be relied upon to demonstrate this type of test deficiency, making institutions that rely on factorist tests more
vulnerable to allegations from minority applicants that their rejection
was anti-meritocratic and illegal, and creating a new legal defense to

16
17

and forward collision warning systems); see also Luigi Fraschini, Making Cars Safer,
VALLEYNEWSLIVE.COM (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.valleynewslive.com/Global/story.asp?s
=13532570 (describing NHTSA’s inclusion of “more rigorous tests based on advanced
safety technology” over the past thirty-two years).
See infra Part III.
See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1122–23 (describing potential liability for discrimination under Title VI for using “selection criteria in a manner that constitutes effect discrimination”).
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the “reverse discrimination” version of such allegations by rejected
whites—this raises the prospect of test deficiency supporting Title VI
19
disparate impact complaints against selective universities and a new
legal defense of race-based affirmative action under the Fourteenth
20
Amendment.
Part I describes the dilemma presented by the approach that universities have used tacitly to defend race-based affirmative action in
higher education admissions—that race consciousness is needed to
reconcile the purported inherent tension between merit-based selection and racial diversity. This Part articulates the need for more intelligent tests—tests that better measure admissions-related merit with
smaller racial gaps in test scores—that can potentially resolve this dilemma. It also contrasts the frequency with which reliance on nontest, non-grade admissions variables are challenged as deviations from
merit with this Article’s consideration of whether reliance on scores
from tests based on scientifically flawed theories of intelligence deprive applicants of fair assessment on the basis of the traditional conception of higher education admissions-related merit.
Part II of this Article provides historical background on the origins of the concept of “g”—the “general factor” of intelligence—and
factorist theories of intelligence as well as early and modern critiques
of the conception of intelligence as “g.” It explains the salient role
that the technology of mental testing, specifically, factorist admissions
tests like the SATs, have traditionally played in implementing the
American ideology of meritocracy in the context of selective higher
education admissions. This Part also explicates how, prior to the existence of new intelligence research highlighted in this Article, it was
generally assumed that, due to their predictive power, factorist tests
like the SAT were the most objective and scientific proxies available
18

19
20

The Court essentially uses the same analysis to evaluate Fourteenth Amendment reverse
discrimination claims filed against public universities as it does to evaluate reverse discrimination filed against private selective universities under Title VI. See Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293–95 & n.11 (1985) (explaining Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). In Guardians Ass’n, a majority of the Court held
that a violation of Title VI required proof of discriminatory purpose, while a different majority held that proof of discriminatory effect suffices when the suit is brought to enforce
regulations issued pursuant to Title VI. Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (detailing the multiple holdings of the Court). Liability under Title VI itself
is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in its requirement
that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240
(1976).
Title VI disparate impact complaints may be filed with the United States Department of
Education Office of Civil Rights. See supra note 5.
See infra Part IV.
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for assessing an applicant’s admissions-related merit. Next, using the
SAT as an example, it describes both the limitations in the predictive
capacity of factorist tests and differences in racial groups’ averaged
scores on conventional factorist tests.
Part III examines contemporary theories of intelligence, referred
to in this Article as “multi-dimensional” theories of intelligence. It
focuses specifically on the operationalization of American psychologist Robert Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory of Successful Intelligence as
new triarchic college admissions tests of “creative,” “practical,” and
21
“analytic” intelligence. It describes a 2006 research project that revealed that triarchic admissions tests based on a systems-based theory
of intelligence were twice as predictive of freshman college grades as
22
the g-loaded SAT with smaller racial differences in test scores.
Part IV of this Article articulates the theoretical, legal, and policy
implications of improved theories of intelligence and empirical evidence of the enhanced predictive power of tests designed according
to newer theories of intelligence. In addition, it asserts that research
demonstrating that factorist tests have, first, less predictive power
and, second, larger racial differences in scores than are scientifically
23
justified—two major “test deficiencies” —make universities that rely
on such tests vulnerable to Title VI disparate impact complaints. This
Part draws from Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke to articulate how
such test deficiencies may form the basis for a legal justification for
greater reliance on systems-based tests, non-test score criteria, or for
considering race in admissions to correct for unjustified racial skews
in factorist tests results—racial differences in scores that stem from
the theoretical deficiencies of factorist theories of intelligence and
the predictive deficiencies of conventional factorist tests.
The Article concludes that scientific intelligence research of modern multi-dimensional theories of intelligence, such as systems-based
intelligence theories, has significant implications. Among the most
significant is its finding that college admissions tests designed accord21

22

23

See Robert J. Sternberg, The Rainbow Project: Enhancing the SAT Through Assessments of Analytical, Practical, and Creative Skills, 34 INTELLIGENCE 321, 323 (2006) [hereinafter The
Rainbow Project] (describing the approach used in Robert Sternberg’s admissions test as
using “modern cognitive theory to understand and measure intelligence as it pertains to
school as well as other forms of success”).
Id. (“Based on multiple regression analyses, for our sample, the . . . [systems-based]
measures alone approximately double the predicted amount of variance in college GPA
2
when compared with the SAT alone (comparative R values of .199 [explains 19.9% of
variation in college GPA] to .098 [explains 9.8% of variation in college GPA], respectively).”).
See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1110 (describing test-deficiency theories).
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ing to newer theories of intelligence are more useful admissions tools
than conventional tests. If proven true, this research suggests that selection based on rank-order scores on conventional factorist tests like
the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT is anti-meritocratic. In addition,
the Article posits that rejected applicants from lower-scoring racial
groups, including African Americans and Latinos, may rely on this
type of intelligence research to argue that overreliance on factorist
tests as admissions criteria is unfair, anti-meritocatic, and illegal under Title VI civil rights disparate impact regulations. In addition, research illuminating theoretical and predictive failings of factorist tests
may also impact reverse discrimination claims filed by rejected white
applicants claiming an institution’s use of race-based affirmative action in admissions violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title VI’s prohibition against purposeful race discrimination.
I. EXAMINING THE CONFLATION OF HIGH TEST SCORES AND MERIT
Certainly the tests do seem to do better than chance. But they do not
have the value that their deceptively precise scoring system suggests.
The proponents’ own data show that, for example, most of those scoring in
the bottom 20% on the test do better than that in law school—indeed six of
every 100 of them will be in the top 20% of their law school class. And no
one knows how many of those who were not admitted because of their test
scores would in fact have done well were they given the chance.
—Justice William O. Douglas, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 1974

24

It is generally the case that an applicant with a higher factorist test
score is viewed as more deserving of admission than a similarly cre25
dentialed applicant with a lower score on the same test. As a result,
24
25

416 U.S. 312, 329 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
Challenges are both formal and informal, ranging from phone calls and letters to admissions offices to complaints with the U.S. Department of Education and lawsuits filed in
federal court. For example, a class of “minorities and women qualified for graduate
school admission” filed an OCR complaint accusing the University of California Berkeley
(“UC Berkeley”) of violating Title VI and Title IX disparate impact regulations after eliminating race- and gender-based affirmative action pursuant to UC Regents Resolution
SP-1. Letter from Abby Leibman, Cal. Women’s Law Ctr. et al., to Stefan Rosenzweig,
Reg’l Dir., Office of Civil Rights, Region IX, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Mar. 19, 1997) (on file
with author); see also Complaint at 3, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525
(N.D. Cal. 1999), settled sub nom. Castaneda v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (“This is an action challenging the discriminatory failure of Defendants
to give full and fair consideration to applications for undergraduate admission to the
University of California at Berkeley . . . .”).
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university leaders, faculty members, and the general public decry the
admission of lower-scoring applicants to the exclusion of higherscoring ones. Many reach these conclusions based on an essentially
“folk” understanding of the nature of mental ability and mental test26
ing.
It is because of this general presumption that rank-ordering by
test score aligns with rank-order admissions merit that universities’
27
reliance on non-test score, non-grade admissions criteria is assumed
by many to be a deviation from a true academic merit-based stan28
dard. Confidence in the merit-measuring capacity of conventional
standardized tests like the SAT is so great that universities like the
University of California, Berkeley (“UC Berkeley”) and the University
of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) that consider selective non-test
admissions criteria, such as whether an applicant has faced adversity,
are often accused of presiding over a “best sob-story” sweepstakes and
29
of granting illegal “preferences” to minority applicants. The accusations that California’s most selective public universities have been
“cheating”—violating state anti-affirmative action laws—are premised

26

27

28

29

Most lay and legal discourse adopts what could be described as a “folk definition” of intelligence that aligns fairly closely to conventional unitary and hierarchical g-centered theories of intelligence. Cf. ROGERS ELLIOT, LITIGATING INTELLIGENCE: IQ TESTS SPECIAL
EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 7 (1987) (citing Lloyd G. Humphreys, General Intelligence, in PERSPECTIVES ON BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (Cecil R. Reynolds
and Robert T. Brown eds., 1984)) (describing the “folk definition” of intelligence as “an
innate, fixed and measurable capacity utilized to varying degrees depending upon the
adequacy of an individual’s environment and the effort the individual expends”).
America’s most elite private universities have long considered non-numerical, qualitative
information—non-test score criteria—to augment applicants’ SAT scores and other quantitative admissions data such as high school GPA. See generally JEROME KARABEL, THE
CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND
PRINCETON 44 (2005) (discussing admissions to Harvard, Yale, and Princeton over the
past century). In recent years, many of the nation’s most selective public universities have
followed suit—adopting non-numerical, “holistic” policies that rely on various non-test
score factors to make admissions decisions. For public universities that consider race as a
factor in admissions, the Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause requires their admissions policies be non-numerical and holistic. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (finding a policy not “narrowly tailored” because the policy did not
contain “individualized consideration”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003)
(“The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious
admissions program is paramount.”).
This shift has been, for many top-ranked public universities, prompted by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Grutter that the use of race-based affirmative action is only narrowly tailored if it is part of a holistic, as opposed to numbers-driven, admissions process. Grutter,
539 U.S. at 343.
See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1086–95 (describing the origins of state anti-affirmative
action laws and how such laws prohibit public universities from granting preferential
treatment on the basis of race).
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implicitly on the assumption that admitting students inconsistently
with the rank order of their SAT score is unfair and anti30
meritocratic.
Despite the fact that elite educational institutions are forthright in
declaring that they rarely, if ever, admit applicants based solely on
31
scores on admissions test like the SAT and LSAT, the institutions
rarely offer a coherent explanation of how much they do rely on test
scores and why they choose a particular degree of reliance. As opposed to articulating an academic merit-based rationale, admissions
officials and university leaders usually defend decisions to consider
criteria other than standardized test scores as necessary to fulfill a
broad institutional “mission” to educate a “diverse” student body.
The implication is that deviation from admission by test score rank
order is the price that must be paid in order to admit members of
lower-scoring racial groups—a presumptive merit versus diversity
trade-off.
It is rare when institutions point to the predictive limitations of
traditional factorist tests like the SAT and LSAT or to potential flaws
in the theories of intelligence underpinning such tests as the rationale for relying on non-test score criteria. Instead, elite institutions
tout their institution’s average SAT, LSAT, GRE, and MCAT as a
32
marker of institutional and student “quality” and “academic selectiv33
ity.” By doing so, selective universities have made themselves susceptible to criticisms that rejections of higher-scoring applicants is
unfair and, if related to race, illegal. A prime example of such criticism is the one lodged by John Moores in 2003 when he contended
that UC Berkeley unfairly denied admissions to applicants with very
high SAT scores.

30

31

32

33

See JOHN MOORES, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY ADMISSIONS PROCESS FOR 2002 3, 183–214 (2003) (including within the report articles about perceived “cheating” around the country).
In fact, they “boast about how many students with astronomical scores are not admitted.”
Kevin Finneran, Too Much Ado About Testing, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 90, 90 (1999) (reviewing
NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY
33 (1999)). See generally Editor’s Stories I, in COLLEGE UNRANKED: AFFIRMING EDUCATIONAL
VALUES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 57 (Lloyd Thacker ed., 2004) (discussing the various efforts by colleges to increase their number of applications).
See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (equating student “quality” with test scores, and noting that “decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT
scores . . . would require a dramatic sacrifice of . . . the academic quality of all admitted
students” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id.
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A. Presumed Merit of High Scorers
Former Regent of the University of California John Moores is
among those who have criticized public universities for passing over
34
high-scoring applicants in favor of individuals with lower test scores.
In 2003, subsequent to the implementation of a new admissions policy at UC Berkeley, then-Regent Moores very publicly criticized the
denial of admission to high school students with high SAT scores as
unfair. The assumption underlying his assertion was that the consideration of admissions criteria other than grades and test scores had
resulted in a dilution of academic merit standards—Moores's claim
was essentially that UC Berkeley had adopted a new admissions policy
that permitted the selective admissions equivalent of “line jumping”—more qualified students were unjustifiably being passed over by
less qualified students. To support his claim, Moores pointed to UC
Berkeley’s denial of 3200 students with SAT scores above 1400 and its
35
decision to admit 386 students with SAT scores of 1000 or below.
Although UC Berkeley did attempt to defend the admissions deci36
sions attacked by Moores, universities across the nation rarely offer
an explicit theoretical and empirical rationale for augmenting applicants’ test scores and grades with quantitative information about applicants. This failure to justify admissions criteria and their weighting
has made universities vulnerable to political and legal claims that
their admissions policies unfairly or illegally fail to select applicants
with the greatest admissions-related merit. An additional consequence of this failing is that it reinforces the perception, articulated

34

35

36

In 2003, the same year the Supreme Court decided the Grutter case, University of California Regent Moores issued a report on the admissions process at UC Berkeley—
California’s most selective public university—examining the number of applicants with
high SAT scores denied admission to UC Berkeley. Moores, supra note 135, at 3, 183–
214. Moores’s challenge of the denial of admission of thousands of high-scoring applicants to UC Berkeley is an example of the inquiry that has previously been the central focus of legal scholarship—whether it is fair for universities to admit applicants with lower
scores on tests like the SAT and reject applicants with higher test scores whose grades may
be equivalent to or better than the low-scoring admitted student.
Pamela Burdman, Admissions Controversy Embroils Berkeley Again, 20 BLACK ISSUES HIGHER
EDUC. 12 (2004). A substantial portion of the admitted students with scores below 1000
were African American and Latino—241 of the 386 lower-scoring admitted students. Id.
See UC Berkeley Responds to Regent Moores’ Report on Admissions, UC BERKELEY NEWS, Oct. 31,
2003, http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/31_moores.shtml (“[ThenRegent Moores’s] report fails to accurately describe the UC Berkeley admissions process
and outcomes.”); see also Chancellor Berdahl’s Letter on UC Berkeley’s Admissions Policy, UC
BERKELEY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2003, http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/06_
admit_rmb.shtml (pointing to “erroneous assumptions” in Moores’s report and making
“additional explanation and analysis”).
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and ascribed to by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger,
that the entire process of selective admissions at the nation’s universi37
ties is “‘poisoned’ by numerous exceptions to ‘merit.’” Justice Thomas’s critique of the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions
policy, like Regent Moores’ critique of UC Berkeley’s undergraduate
admissions policy, is emblematic of a common perception that elite
public and private educational institutions regularly deviate from selecting individuals based on admissions-related merit.
B. The Diversity Rationale’s Tacit Conflation
In Grutter and its companion case Gratz v. Bollinger, the Supreme
Court held that a university’s educational interest in “diversity”—the
goal of admitting more than a token number of members of a racial
group that would otherwise be present in only very small numbers—
constitutes a compelling justification for considering race as an ad38
missions factor.
Writing for the majority in Grutter, Justice
O’Connor concludes that the University of Michigan Law School established that its means of considering race in admissions—as part of
a holistic, non-numerical consideration of the applicants’ entire
file—was “narrowly tailored” but holds that the more numbers-driven
undergraduate admissions policy challenged in Gratz is not narrowly
39
tailored.
Central to the Court’s analysis in Grutter is its acceptance of the
University of Michigan’s empirical claim that considering race as a
40
factor in admissions is the only “workable” means for the law school
to admit a critical mass of underrepresented minority applicants
41
without lowering its current academic admissions standards. The
Court ultimately distinguishes the Michigan Law School and undergraduate policies based on how rigidly and numerically race was considered as a factor; it accepts the narrow tailoring argument offered
37
38

39

40
41

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 329 (majority opinion) (discussing a university’s right to select a diverse student
body in seeking to achieve goals important to its mission). The current “diversity rationale” for race-based affirmative action in selective higher education admissions stems
from Justice Powell’s dispositive concurring opinion in the case Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s “individualized consideration” requirement encourages government decision-makers to not disclose how much
racial preference it is giving).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40.
Id. (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).
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by the University of Michigan that the institution could not maintain
high academic test and grade merit standards without considering
42
applicants’ race as a factor in admissions.
Although some amici in Grutter challenged the presumption that
43
LSAT scores were accurate measures of merit, the University of
Michigan Law School did not emphasize the predictive limitations of
the LSAT. University defendants in reverse discrimination cases rarely argue that they select lower-scoring non-white applicants because
44
they are actually more qualified than higher-scoring whites. Instead,
universities usually take the position that considering race in admissions is the most narrowly tailored means of achieving the educationally optimal level of racial diversity because race-neutral policies
would come at too great an expense to their institutions’ high academic standards.
According to the University of Michigan’s position in Grutter, raceconscious affirmative action is necessary because so few AfricanAmerican and Latino students have LSAT scores in the ultra-high
ranges—the LSAT range of the most selective law schools in the nation—that the small number of African-American and Latino students with LSAT scores in that highest range will be admitted to multiple top law schools and hence will not all choose to attend Michigan
45
Law School. In short, the University of Michigan argues that there
simply are not enough ultra-high-scoring African-American and Latino applicants to admit significant numbers of them without race46
consciousness. Thus, in defending affirmative action, the University
42

43

44

45

46



See Brief for Respondent at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
2003 WL 402236 (“No honestly colorblind alternative could produce educationally meaningful racial diversity at present without substantially abandoning reliance on traditional
academic criteria, and hence abandoning academic excellence as well.”).
See, e.g., Brief for New York State Black and Puerto Rican Legislative Caucus as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241), 2003 WL 554403. (“Test scores can also be adversely affected by candidates’ unconscious reaction to widespread stereotypes disparaging the intellectual abilities of minority group members.”).
Cf. Charles R. Lawrence, Essay, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 958 (2001) (criticizing universities and the “liberal
defense . . . of affirmative action” for this failure). See also West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at
1148 (“[W]hen selective universities invoke the diversity rationale, those institutions are
rarely called upon to identify explicitly the characteristics that qualify or disqualify minority applicants.”).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 5 (noting that “[i]n 1997 when petitioner applied,
there were only 67 minority [African-American, Latino and Native-American] applicants,
compared to 1236 white and Asian American applicants, in the LSAT range (164+) from
which over 90% of the admitted white students were drawn”).
Id. at 13 (arguing that “[g]iven the . . . population of college graduates, however, law
schools like Michigan cannot admit those [minority students whose admissions would in-
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of Michigan adopts the typical approach of universities defending
their affirmative action policies under the diversity rationale—
asserting that the consideration of race is narrowly tailored because
elite educational institutions cannot maintain their desired meritbased academic standards and also admit more than a token number
of applicants from lower-scoring racial groups.
This approach to defending affirmative action tacitly conflates
high scores on the LSAT with admissions-related merit. Even as the
University of Michigan describes the African-American and Latino
47
applicant pool as “talented” and “well-qualified,” LSAT scores are
elevated over college grades as a more critical criterion for maintain48
Without explaining
ing high academic admissions standards.
whether students with ultra-high college grade point averages
(“GPAs”) could potentially be as qualified as, or possibly more qualified than, applicants with ultra-high LSAT scores, the University of
Michigan implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff that elite law
schools make when they admit lower-scoring non-white students.
By stating that “[i]n 2000, there were only 26 African-American
applicants nationwide with at least a 3.5 grade point average and a
49
165 on the LSAT compared to 3173 whites and Asian Americans,”
the University underscores how very important it deems LSAT scores
despite having acknowledged that an applicant’s LSAT score is an
50
imperfect predictor of future grades in law school. Moreover, in
Grutter, the University of Michigan takes no position as to the comparative admissions-related merit of the minority students with LSAT
scores below 164 or 165 that it admits under affirmative action. Specifically, the University declines to assert explicitly that some applicants with lower LSAT scores are, in certain instances, more qualified
51
than applicants with higher test scores. Interestingly, Justice Tho-

47
48

49
50

51



crease racial diversity] in meaningful numbers without paying some attention to race”);
see also id. at 6 (observing that competition for the sixty-seven African-American, Latino
and Native American students with LSAT scores of 164 and higher “is extremely fierce”).
Id. at 6.
See id. at 36 (describing the prospect of “lower standards” as “setting the bar so low” that
the law school would “become a very different institution” and force it “to sacrifice a core
part of its educational mission”).
Id. at 5.
See id. at 4 (describing the law school admissions policy as requiring careful consideration
of applicants’ grades and LSAT scores because “they are important (though imperfect)
predictors of academic success in law school”).
The closest the University of Michigan comes to making this argument is its mention of
the role that “other diversity factors” play in the acceptance of white and Asian students
with LSAT scores of 160 or below and the fact that, between 1995 and 2000, the law
school rejected sixty-nine African-American, Latino, and Native-American applicants
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mas, in dissent, makes this assertion, in part, a basis for concluding
that the Michigan Law School’s admissions policy is unconstitutional.
C. Thomas’s Test Deficiency Critique
52

In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Thomas contends that the major
problem with Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion is that it accepts
the University of Michigan Law School’s inaccurate characterization
of its compelling interest in considering race as a factor in admis53
sions. Thomas expresses a great deal of skepticism as to whether it
is necessary for Michigan Law School to base admission on LSAT
54
scores. Thomas claims that, contrary to the law school’s assertion
that its reason for considering race is to provide students the educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student body, the law
school actually seeks “to improve marginally the education it offers
55
without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.” The
solution that Justice Thomas proposes is that the defendant law
56
school end its reliance on the LSAT admissions test. Thomas is of
the view that the institution could adopt different admissions methods “such as admitting all students who meet minimum qualifications” instead of students with the highest LSAT scores and achieve
its goal of racial diversity without needing to rely on race-based affir57
mative action. In fact, he questions whether standardized admis-

52

53

54

55
56
57

“with at least a 3.5 GPA and a 159 or higher on the LSAT, while 85 white and Asian American applicants were accepted [with] the same or lower [credentials].” Id. at 10 (emphasis
in original).
Thomas dissents to all but a small portion of Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion—the
portion stating that affirmative action will no longer be necessary in twenty-five years.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 375, 377 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the practices will be illegal in twenty-five years because
they are illegal at the time of the decision). In fact, several Justices were explicit in their
dissents in Grutter that they will, if given the opportunity in a future case, interpret the
majority reasoning in the decision to mean that the diversity rationale is set to expire
twenty-five years after the Grutter ruling. Id. at 386–87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the time limit runs the risk of becoming permanent).
Id. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the law
school’s real interest—“offering a marginally superior education while maintaining an
elite institution”—is not its proffered interest of “diversity” and is not compelling under
equal protection analysis).
Id. at 367 (“[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other measures to ‘predict’ academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every
applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law.”).
Id. at 355–56.
Id. at 368 (observing that “there is nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally protected about ‘selective’ admissions”).
Id. at 361–62.
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sions tests truly have the capacity to predict who will succeed in law
58
school. Thomas seems to believe African-American students, in particular, would be better served if assessed based on non-test criteria—
by “looking for those students who, despite a lower LSAT score or
59
undergraduate GPA, will succeed in the study of law” and then
“matching” African-American students to the law school where they
60
are likely to succeed academically.
Having found more wrong than right with the University of Michigan’s selective admissions based on standardized tests, Thomas offers
additional reasons to be critical of the impact that reliance on LSAT
scores has on lower-scoring groups like African-American students.
Beyond questioning the predictive capacity of the LSAT and other
standardized admissions tests, Thomas accuses elite universities of using “intelligence tests,” in the past, to intentionally discriminate
against applicants on the basis of their race, ethnicity and religion,
and of currently using intelligence tests “with full knowledge of their
61
disparate impact” against groups like African Americans. Thomas
ultimately exploits the University of Michigan’s tacit suggestion that
high academic standards and racial diversity in admissions are in tension by asserting that, to the extent such a tension exists, it can be resolved without race-consciousness; according to Justice Thomas, the
university has the option of choosing between diversity and elite62
ness. To explain how the University of Michigan could exercise its
options, Thomas suggests the adoption of a non-test-driven “certifi-

58
59
60
61

62

Id.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 369. On this specific point, Justice Thomas wrote:
The initial driving force for the relocation of the selective function from the high
school to the universities was the same desire to select racial winners and losers
that the Law School exhibits today . . . . Columbia employed intelligence tests precisely because Jewish applicants, who were predominantly immigrants, scored
worse on such tests. Thus, Columbia could claim (falsely) that “[w]e have not
eliminated boys because they were Jews and do not propose to do so. We have
honestly attempted to eliminate the lowest grade of applicant [through the use of
intelligence testing] and it turns out that a good many of the low grade men are
New York City Jews.” In other words, the tests were adopted with full knowledge of
their disparate impact.
Id. (citations omitted).
Justice Thomas asserts that top ranked public graduate schools, colleges and universities
like the University of Michigan and its law school do not have a compelling interest in using race-conscious admissions because they have the option of choosing whether to be racially “diverse” or “elite.” See id. at 372 & n.11, 373 (discussing the subjective assessments
of “know-it-all-elites”). Thomas suggests public higher education should not be elite—it
should be available to any “certified” graduate who completes a required course of study.
Id. at 368–69.
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63

cate system” admissions process. Presumably, under this system of
certification, students who complete a particular course of undergraduate study would be admitted without reliance on standardized test
scores and then retained or expelled from the law school according
64
to that individual’s actual performance as a law student.
Thomas’s suggestion highlights the relationship between selective
universities’ reliance on standardized tests and their institutional
65
prestige. Doctrinally, Thomas argues that Michigan Law School’s
failure to adopt race-neutral alternatives like the certificate system of
admissions to achieve the benefits of racial diversity demonstrates
that the challenged race-conscious admissions policy should be
deemed unconstitutional due to the existence of race-neutral alterna66
tives.
Moreover, Thomas does not believe that Michigan Law
School’s reliance on the LSAT serves any real educational purpose;
he thinks the law school uses the LSAT to admit ultra-high-scorers on
the LSAT because that translates into “selectivity” which is a marker
67
of elite-ness. Yet, he vacillates between criticizing the LSAT—on
one hand he expresses his view that the LSAT is a weak predictor of
68
success in law school and that the racial gap in scores could be
closed if African Americans had greater incentive to invest in more
test preparation—and acquiescing to the LSAT’s assessment of African-American students—he thinks the racial gap in LSAT scores will
69
still exist in twenty-five years.
Ultimately, Justice Thomas’s quandary suggests a vulnerability for
selective universities that differs from the reverse discrimination-type
claim made on behalf of rejected whites in the Grutter case. Innovations in testing technology—the development of standardized tests
that more accurately predict test-takers’ future academic success with
less racially skewed scores than traditional admissions tests like the
70
LSAT and SAT —increase the likelihood that rejected non-whites
will challenge their rejection based on conventional standardized
admissions tests. Even though tests like the LSAT and SAT are suffi63
64
65
66
67

68
69
70

Id. at 368–69.
Id.
See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1108 (discussing how the average SAT score is used to
gauge an institution’s prestige).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368-69 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I have articulated elsewhere that the capacity of standardized tests as “prestigeenhancing” tools may be more significant to elite educational institutions than their merit-measuring capacity. See, e.g., West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1083.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 363.
See infra Part III.
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ciently predictive for universities to legally justify reliance on them in
the absence of equally predictive and less racially skewed tests, modern intelligence theories leading to the development of more predictive tests with smaller racial differences in scores make reliance on
traditional tests more difficult to justify. At their current levels of
predictive power—explaining less than 20% of the variation in test71
takers’ future academic performance, conventional standardized
admissions tests are sufficiently imperfect that institutions placing inappropriately heavily reliance on them are potentially vulnerable to
policy critiques and legal challenges on “test deficiency” grounds. It
is my contention in this Article that test deficiency-type claims, if empirically verifiable, may be asserted by rejected non-white applicants
filing Title VI disparate impact administrative complaints.
While it is unclear whether the current Court would entertain test
deficiency as a justification for race-based affirmative action in admissions, earlier Justices have. Most notably, Justice Powell’s controlling
72
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke suggests an
analytic framework for considering the deficiencies of standardized
tests as a justification for reduced reliance on test scores or race73
consciousness to compensate for such tests’ failings. Dissenting in
74
DeFunis v. Odegaard, Justice Douglas seems willing to apply distinct
legal analysis when scores on the LSAT test misclassify test-takers’
75
admissions-related merit due to test deficiencies. Below, this Article

71
72
73

74
75



See infra Part II.A.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 306 n.43 (concluding that the consideration of race as a factor in medical school
admissions is arguably not racially preferential if adopted to cure "established inaccuracies" in the capacity of the MCAT medical school admissions test to predict academic performance).
416 U.S. 312, 329 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the “deceptively precise
scoring system” of the LSAT).
In his dissent to the per curiam opinion dismissing a case filed by a white applicant to the
University of Washington claiming the law school’s affirmative action policy violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Justice Douglas drew
attention to the defendant law school’s failure to argue that minority applicants with lower LSAT scores might nevertheless have greater admissions-related merit than white applicants with higher LSAT scores:
[B]y whatever techniques, the law school must make choices. Neither party has
challenged the validity of the [LSAT-GPA composite score] Average employed
here as an admissions tool, and therefore consideration of its possible deficiencies
is not presented as an issue. The Law School presented no evidence to show that
adjustments in the process employed were used in order validly to compare applicants of different races; instead . . . [the Law School] chose to avoid making such
comparisons . . . . To the contrary, the school appears to have conceded that by its
own assessment—taking all factors into account—it admitted minority applicants
who would have been rejected had they been white.
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examines the significance of new scientific research on intelligence
and mental testing that did not exist when Justice Powell and Justice
Douglas expressed their seeming willingness to entertain test deficiency defenses to reverse discrimination lawsuits filed by rejected
white applicants. To further explicate the “test deficiency” framework, Parts II and III respectively, describe, first, the origins and current uses of conventional standardized admissions tests by focusing
on the SAT as an example and, second, how modern multidimensional theories of intelligence challenge the conventional
theories of intelligence upon which tests like the SAT are modeled.
II. FROM GENERAL INTELLIGENCE TO SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS
Test constructors will continue to employ factorial procedures, provided they
pay off in improving the efficiency and predictive value of our test
batteries . . . . The continuous difficulties with factor analysis over the last
half century suggest that there may be something fundamentally wrong with
models which conceptualize intelligence in terms of a finite number of
linear dimensions.
76

—Read D. Tuddenham

While philosophical discussions about the nature of human intel77
ligence date back thousands of years, the first scientific theory of in-

76
77

Id. at 330–31. Justice Douglas took it upon himself to make the argument, which the law
school did not, by asserting the limitations in predictive capacity of admissions test like
the LSAT:
Of course, the law school that admits only those with the highest test scores finds
that on the average they do much better, and thus the test is a convenient tool for
the admissions committee. The price is paid by the able student who for unknown
reasons did not achieve that high score—perhaps even the minority with a different cultural background. Some tests, at least in the past, have been aimed at eliminating Jews.
Id. at 329. (discussing data showing that six of every 100 students scoring in the bottom
20% of the LSAT end up in the top 20% of their law school class). This Article’s focus is
on the theoretical and predictive inadequacies of conventional factorist tests, not allegations that such tests are culturally biased. By contrast, Justices Powell and Douglas seem
to assume that the test deficiency would be cultural bias.
Read D. Tuddenham, The Nature and Measurement of Intelligence, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
MAKING: HISTORIES OF SELECTED RESEARCH PROBLEMS 469, 516 (Leo Postman ed.,1964).
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT 146 (Nicholas Walker ed., James
Creed Meredith trans., 2d ed. 2007) (“Genius, according to these presuppositions, is the
exemplary originality of the natural endowments of a subject in the free employment of
his cognitive faculties.”); PLATO, REPUBLIC 264 (Robin Waterfield trans., 1993) (“[T]he
summit of the intelligible realm is reached when, by means of dialectic and without relying on anything perceptible, a person perseveres in using rational argument to approach
the true reality of things until he has grasped with his intellect the reality of goodness itself.”); see also CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 2 (“[I]deas about the nature of
intelligence have existed for thousands of years . . . .”).
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telligence was introduced at the turn of the twentieth century. In an
article written in 1904, British psychologist Charles Spearman posited, based on the application of a mathematical operation Spear79
man invented called “factor analysis,” that the reason scores on intelligence tests are correlated with each other is attributable to a
80
dominant “general factor” that governs all mental ability. Spearman
deemed “g” as that general factor of intelligence because he believed
it to be a mental ability that is common to all subjects and therefore
distinguishable and more significant than what Spearman termed
“specific” mental abilities—those specific to particular subject mat81
ter. The hallmark of Spearman’s g-based theory of intelligence or
82
the g-oriented psychometric perspective is that what is common
across all intelligence tests is a single, unitary, linearly rankable, mea83
surable generalized mental energy.
However, dating back to the earliest days of mental testing, gbased theories of intelligence have been challenged and alternative
84
theories posited. Experts have also theorized that intelligence is “in85
formation processing”—accurately identifying trends and patterns,

78
79
80
81
82

83

84

85

CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 2 (“[M]uch of what we know about intelligence
has been discovered since the late nineteenth century.”).
Factor analysis is, generally speaking, the use of sophisticated mathematical operations to
test or confirm generalizations. See, e.g., CHILD, supra note 8.
C. Spearman, “General Intelligence,” Objectively Determined and Measured, 15 AM. J. PSYCHOL.
201, 284–85 (1904).
Id.
See Harold W. Goldstein, et. al., Revisiting g: Intelligence, Adverse Impact, and Personnel Selection, in ADVERSE IMPACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES
SELECTION 95 (James Outtz ed., 2010) (“The quality referred to is known as g . . . [and it]
reflect[s] a particular perspective within the study of intelligence known as the psychometric approach that many within the field of industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology
have seemingly adopted.” (internal citations omitted)).
CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing Spearman, who believed “g” to be
some form of generalized “mental energy”). See, e.g., RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, A
COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 343 (1998).
An early critic of the theory of intelligence as a general ability was Sir Godfrey Thomson,
a contemporary and colleague of Spearman. Thomson offered the earliest rival theory to
Spearman’s theory of “g.” Thomson accepted Spearman’s mathematical data (factor
analysis) and results but interpreted them to support a different theory. In Thomson’s
view, “[f]ar from being divided up into ‘unitary factors,’ the mind is a rich, comparatively
undifferentiated complex of innumerable influences—on the physiological side an intricate network of possibilities of intercommunication.” GODFREY H. THOMSON, THE
FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF HUMAN ABILITY 267 (1939).
See Joseph F. Fagan, A Theory of Intelligence as Processing: Implications for Society, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 168, 168 (2000) (considering implications of “defining intelligence as
processing”).
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speed, including reaction and inspection time, one’s ability to
87
88
adapt, working memory, and application of memory. Some have
conceived of intelligence as prior knowledge, such as expertise in
89
90
language and vocabulary and multiplicities of intelligence. Hence,
differing perspectives as to how intelligence should be conceptualized are as old as the concept of “g.” Over the past thirty years, intelligence research challenging the theoretical underpinnings of goriented factorist tests has further spurred the debate over whether a
91
“general factor” of intelligence or singular “g” exists.
A. The Rise of Factorist Tests and America’s Meritocracy Ideology
Almost contemporaneously with Spearman’s development of a gcentered theory of intelligence in the early 1900s, French psychologist Alfred Binet developed a new tool for measuring mental ability—
a new mental test that proved to be as influential as Spearman’s
theory. Binet’s early “intelligence test” was designed to diagnose
children with learning problems for placement in a “special educa92
tion” program. The Binet test was administered one-on-one by a
86

87

88

89

90
91
92



See ARTHUR JENSEN, CLOCKING THE MIND: MENTAL CHRONOMETRY AND INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 244 (2006) (describing “chronometry,” or the measurement of cognitive
speed, as a “uniquely valuable instrument for measuring interindividual and intraindividual variation in many cognitive phenomena”); C. SPEARMAN, THE ABILITIES OF MAN:
THEIR NATURE AND MEASUREMENT 245 (1927) (“[I]f we desire any genuine measurement
of cognitive ability, it is to these universal quantitative properties of clearness and speed
that we are obliged to turn.”).
See ALFRED BINET & THEODORE SIMON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN
43 (Elizabeth S. Kite trans., 1916) (“To judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well,
these are the essential activities of intelligence.”); ROBERT J. STERNBERG, BEYOND IQ: A
TRIARCHIC THEORY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1985).
See generally, John L. Horn & Jennie Noll, Human Cognitive Capabilities: Gf-Gc Theory, in
CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS, & ISSUES 53 (Dawn P. Flanagan et al. eds., 1997) (describing such themes of intelligence); K. Anders Ericsson &
Walter Kintsch, Long-Term Working Memory, 105 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 211–45 (1995) (same).
See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND:
THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE
INTELLIGENCES (1983) (describing multiple types of intelligence, including bodilykinesthetic intelligence, interpersonal intelligence and musical intelligence); HOWARD
GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(1999) (same).
See BINET & SIMON, supra note 87, at 40 (describing the pedagogical method of measuring
intelligence as judging intelligence “according to the sum of acquired knowledge”).
Goldstein et al., supra note 82, at 108 (“[E]stablishing a psychometric phenomenon of g
does not mean that a psychological construct exists.” (internal citation omitted)).
See CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 33–34 (“[B]inet’s interest in intelligence
testing arose from the . . . practical concern of discriminating between people who could
succeed academically and who could not . . . . Children shown via examination to have
mental deficiencies were to be placed in special-education programs.”). Binet wrote an
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psychologist who led the child taking the test through a series of tasks
to assess the child’s “general potential” with a single score Binet
93
Binet’s test, particularly its apcalled the child’s “mental age.”
proach of assigning a numerical score to an individual’s performance
on a mental test, and Spearman’s theory of the “g” general intelligence factor had a strong influence on intelligence research and the
94
design of mental tests for the rest of the twentieth century.
In 1916, at Stanford University, American psychologist Lewis
Terman revised the “mental age” scale created by Binet and renamed
95
it the “Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales.” Terman’s Stanford-Binet
intelligence test assigned test-takers an Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”)
score—the ratio of their “mental” age and chronological age—based
96
on their test performance. Terman’s new IQ test led to the widespread use of intelligence testing to sort individuals based on their
97
test-predicted potential to perform particular jobs. During World
War I, Terman, along with several other American pyschometricians—Henry Goddard, Robert Yerkes, and Carl Brigham—
successfully demonstrated that intelligence testing could be accom98
plished on a mass scale.
The first mass-produced and massadministered tests of intelligence—the Army Alpha and Beta exams—

93

94
95

96

97

98

influential article describing his test with Theodore Simon, published in 1905. BINET &
SIMON, supra note 87.
Binet’s test brought “together a large series of short tasks, related to everyday problems of
life (counting coins, or assessing which face is ‘prettier,’ for example), but supposedly involving such basic processes of reasoning as direction (ordering), comprehension, invention and censure (correction).” STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 149
(1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See e.g., ROBERT STERNBERG, HANDBOOK ON INTELLIGENCE 17.
CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 34 (“The first major revision was completed by
Lewis Terman . . . . He translated the test (to the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales) for
American use . . . .”). An individual’s IQ is defined as that person’s mental age (determined based on performance on the ninety Stanford-Binet tasks) divided by his or her
chronological age and multiplied by 100. Id.
Terman’s test remains influential to this day. Other standardized tests are deemed valid
and reliable to the extent that their results align with psychometric properties of the
Stanford-Binet IQ test. Id.
Terman also advocated using mental tests to determine whether an individual possessed
sufficient intelligence to perform particular jobs. LEWIS M. TERMAN, THE MEASUREMENT
OF INTELLIGENCE 17 (Ellwood P. Cubberley ed., 1916) (“Researches of this kind will ultimately determine the minimum ‘intelligence quotient’ necessary for success in each leading occupation.”).
See, e.g., CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 35 (“The shift from one-on-one testing
to group testing required substantial changes to intelligence test design. These changes
included (1) the presentation of brief, written items in lieu of more complicated tasks requiring detailed instructions; (2) the replacement of examiner judgment with objective,
right/wrong scoring techniques; (3) the imposition of time limits for test completion;
and (4) the development of test problems appropriate for adults.”)
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99

were used to test 1.75 million men. Although the Army did not
choose to rely on the results of the Alpha and Beta exams tests to sort
individuals as rigidly as the psychologists who created the tests had
100
advocated, the large data set produced by the Army exams laid the
scientific foundation for a new college admissions test that would become integral to elite higher education admissions in the United
101
States.
1. Early Use of the SAT
Princeton psychologist Carl Brigham became an important figure
in the history of college admissions testing because he used the Army
Alpha and Beta exams as a template for a test of an individual’s “scholastic aptitude”—the now famous Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”).
Brigham’s invention in the 1920s of a mass-market college admissions
test contributed significantly to the rise of a “meritocratic ideology” in
elite higher education admissions that began in the early 1930s and
continues today. In 1934, when Harvard University announced a
scholarship program to admit the most “naturally brilliant” young
men from across the country—Harvard’s National Scholars Program—the program’s goal was to identify students with “the brains”
to excel at Harvard but lacking the financial means to pay Harvard’s
102
high tuition. On the advice of Henry Chauncey, an associate dean
who soon became the first President of today’s Educational Testing
103
Service (“ETS”), Harvard President James Conant decided to identify Harvard National Scholars using the newly developed product of
psychometric research—the SAT.
Conant’s goal was to select high school students with the intellectual ability to become Harvard National Scholars without regard to
their socio-economic class status. Essentially Chauncey convinced
99

100
101

102
103

GOULD, supra note 93, at 195 (“[Yerkes] now had uniform data on 1.75 million men, and
he had devised, in the Alpha and Beta exams, the first mass-produced written tests of intelligence.”).
See id. at 194 (“I do not think that the army ever made much use of the tests.”).
See id. at 195 (“[T]he major impact of Yerkes’s tests did not fall upon the army . . . . Binet’s purpose could now be circumvented because a technology had been developed for testing all pupils. Tests could now rank and stream everybody; the era of
mass testing had begun.”).
LEMANN, supra note 31, at 28.
The ETS is currently the company that designs and sells the world’s most widely used
standardized tests. In addition to the SAT, ETS designs, sells, and administers the Preliminary SAT (“PSAT”), Advanced Placement (“AP”) tests, and GRE. See Tests & Products,
ETS, http://www.ets.org/tests_products (last visited May 11, 2011) (listing the tests and
products offered by ETS).
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Conant that Brigham’s new standardized test was a scientific breakthrough that made this possible. Hence, within thirty years of the
publication of Charles Spearman’s seminal article on the “g” general
factor of intelligence, Harvard University had adopted the practice of
104
relying on the g-based SAT to select students.
Conant set in motion an approach to elite higher education admissions that viewed mental testing as a path to upward mobility and
national leadership for (white male) students who were among Amer105
ica’s intellectual elite.
Subsequently, the College Entrance Examination Board (“the College Board”) adopted the SAT to replace the
subject-matter essay exams aligned with the curriculum of east coast
preparatory schools that had previously been administered to appli106
cants to elite private colleges such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.
Notably, Brigham’s views about racial, ethnic, and class differences in
107
intelligence did not stop university leaders like Harvard President
104

105

106

107



See LEMANN, supra note 31, at 43 (“[T]here was the possibility of creating a true national
aristocracy to govern America . . . . Moreover, science . . . now offered in mental testing a
way of selecting the country’s deserving new leaders. The SAT, in other words, would finally make possible the creation of a natural aristocracy.”).
While it is likely that Conant shared the prevailing view of non-whites as less intelligent
than whites, Conant’s focus was the issue of class. The Harvard National Scholars Program was limited to white male applicants. See KARABEL, supra note 27, at 177 (noting that
although the National Scholars program opened the doors of Harvard to working class
whites, “the program discouraged black applicants and discriminated against those Jews
who did apply”); see also LEMANN, supra note 31, at 47 (noting that “the most obvious departures from the American democratic ideal during the 1940s—legal segregation in the
South, informal segregation elsewhere, and the relegation of women to a secondary position in society—went unmentioned by Conant in his writings”).
See KARABEL, supra note 27, at 44 (“Among the most important [measures] were the decision in 1905–1906 to replace Harvard’s own exams with those of the College Entrance
Examination Board . . . .”).
See, e.g., CARL C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE (1923). Carl Brigham is
noted for studying racial and ethnic differences in the Army test results and advocating
restrictions on immigration and the regulation of reproduction based on his findings. See
GOULD, supra note 93, at 224–31 (describing Brigham’s belief in innate intelligence and
stating that “the army data had its most immediate and profound impact upon the great
immigration debate, then a major political issue in America, and ultimately the greatest
triumph of eugenics”); see also, e.g, STERNBERG, supra note 87, at 28 (describing these psychologist as believing “that Africans and their descendants differed in intelligence from
White people for genetic reasons” and identifying the contemporary writings of Richard
J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray and Arthur Jensen as supporting this view as well). Carl
Brigham was one of many central figures in the history of intelligence research, including
British psychologist Sir Francis Galton, who believed that there are significant differences
in the intelligence levels—average levels of “g”—of racial, ethnic, and class groups and
that these group differences were primarily hereditary. Id. Today, contemporary psychometricians such as Arthur Jensen and Linda Gottfredson still argue in support of the
“hereditability” of the “g” factor. See generally, ARTHUR R. JENSEN, THE g FACTOR: THE
SCIENCE OF MENTAL ABILITY (Seymour W. Itzkoff ed., 1998) (concluding that intelligence
is best understood as driven by the general intelligence factor); Linda S. Gottfredson, The
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James Conant and, later, the College Board from utilizing the SAT.
Himself an intellectual success story not born into the upper class,
Conant sought to set in motion a new approach to elite higher education admissions that created a path to upward mobility and national
leadership for intelligent men of middle class means who performed
well on factorist tests like the SAT.
2. The Promise of the SAT’s Predictive Power
When first administered in 1926, the SAT offered “something entirely new: an easily scored, multiple-choice instrument for measur-

108

General Intelligence Factor, SCI. AM. PRESENTS 27 (1998) (“Differences in general intelligence, whether measured as IQ or, more accurately, as g are both genetic and environmental in origin . . . .”). Although Brigham acknowledged years later that the Army exams primarily measured differences in the reading levels of the men who had taken
Alpha and Beta exams, Brigham was among the first of many psychometricians to calculate the racial group mean (average) scores of the men who took the Army tests and to
point to the lower average score of particular groups, such as African Americans and
Eastern Europeans, as proof that such groups were innately less intelligent—possessed
less “g”—than Nordic whites. See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 93, at 232–33. Today, there is
some dispute as to when and the degree to which Brigham recanted his views about
group differences in intelligence. See LEMANN, note 31, at 33 (describing fundamental
changes in Brigham’s views). But see DAVID OWEN & MARILYN DOERR, NONE OF THE
ABOVE: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE SATS, REVISED AND UPDATED 180–84 (Joe L. Kincheloe
ed., 1999) (noting the financial interest that the ETS and the College Board have in overstating the degree to which Brigham distanced himself from his hereditarian and eugenic
writings).
University leaders, including those who held leadership positions within the College
Board, likely agreed with or at least were aware of Brigham’s view that intelligence differed due to genetic differences among ethnic, racial, and class groups. The overwhelming suggestion of historical accounts is that the presumption of the intellectual inferiority
of certain members of American society (i.e. African Americans and women) was so widely held that it was rarely the subject of discussion. Cf. LEMANN, supra note 31, at 47 (discussing Conant’s thoughts on the question of how to “build a classless society” despite use
of tests that “relentlessly classif[ied] the entire population”); David Owen, Inventing the
SAT, 8 APF REPORTER(1985), available at http://aliciapatterson.org/APF0801/Owen/
Owen.html (“To say that Brigham and the College Board created the SAT to keep blacks
and recent immigrants out of college would be quite misleading, however. Simply put,
Brigham and the Board did not think of either group (or of women, for that matter) as a
threat to the Ivy League. The point of the SAT was to extend the Alpha standard to what
Brigham and the Board viewed as mainstream American culture. Brigham intended his
test to establish a ‘scale of brightness’ on which the ‘native capacity’ of the nation’s best
and brightest young men could be measured and compared. The SAT would be the cornerstone of a new American social order—the aristocracy of aptitude, the meritocracy.
The exclusion of blacks and other unfortunates was taken for granted.”); see also OWEN &
DOERR, supra note 107, at 182 (“To say that Brigham and the College Board created the
SAT to keep blacks and recent immigrants out of college would be quite misleading . . . . Simply put, Brigham and the Board did not think of either group (or of women)
as a threat to the Ivy League.”).
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ing students’ general ability or aptitude for learning.” Brigham, the
SAT’s creator, had conducted studies he claimed demonstrated that
110
the SAT could predict a test-taker’s future academic performance.
Based on its capacity to predict individual scholastic potential, the
SAT college admissions test became a central feature of the “meritocracy” ethos now at the heart of American selective admissions. In
historical context, the tenets of this new meritocractic ideal were a
significant change from the class-restrictive status quo in elite higher
education admissions.
A key principle (without regard to the exclusion of non-whites
and white women) was that individuals with high general intellectual
ability, not just members of the upper socioeconomic class, should be
admitted to the nation’s top colleges if they possessed scientifically
111
discernable superior mental ability.
Prior to the creation of the
SAT, middle and working class students had virtually no access to the
nation’s elite private universities because only students who attended
elite private secondary schools took courses in high school that prepared them to take the curriculum-specific essay exams administered
112
in Latin by the College Board.
Mental tests like Brigham’s SAT
were touted as a new technology that could expand access to elite
higher education beyond the upper classes
The capacity of the SAT to predict future academic performance
was central to Conant’s class-focused (but race- and genderexclusionary) vision of allowing the academically talented to gain
access to elite universities irrespective of their financial and social status. Analysis of the college grades of students selected as Harvard National Scholars based on their high SAT scores supported the theory
that SAT scores could identify students who would excel in college

109
110
111

112

Atkinson & Geiser, supra note 4, at 666 (citing LEMANN, supra note 31).
LEMANN, supra note 31, at 33 (“Brigham had data to support the idea that the SAT could
predict academic performance.”).
For instance, the presumption is that a public high school student has a better chance of
performing well on the SAT, because it measures general intellectual ability, than he
would on curriculum specific essay exams emphasizing subject-matter available to upper
class students. See generally KARABEL, supra note 27, at 2 (describing the history of selective
admissions at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton and explaining that “academic merit” has only
recently become a major factor in determining which students to select and that, dating
back to earliest uses of the SAT as an admissions criteria, elite universities adopted admissions policies that afforded sufficient “discretion and opacity” to permit officials to “accept—and to reject—whomever they desired”).
See, e.g., id. at 22–23 (“Both Yale and Princeton required that candidates pass examinations in both Greek and Latin, thereby effectively excluding most high school graduates,
for only a handful of public schools offered both languages.”).
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113

academics. Many of Harvard’s SAT-identified National Scholars did
go on to graduate cum laude, magna cum laude, and summa cum
114
Harvard’s program
laude and to be elected Phi Beta Kappa.
boosted an “emerging national movement for the ‘scientific’ evaluation of academic potential” that soon led to the SAT being required
115
of all applicants to leading colleges.
Thus, Harvard was among the first educational institutions to consider SAT scores based on their potential to predict future grades in
116
college. Conant’s objective for the Harvard National Scholars Program can be fairly described as seeking to identify intellectual “diamonds in the rough,” individuals who possess the greatest intellectual ability and who exert the greatest amount of effort to apply that
ability but lack the privileges of the aristocratic class. The underlying
assumption is that these chosen meritocrats will go on to utilize their
talents for the greater good and betterment of society.
First introduced at Harvard by Conant, the meritocracy-driven
ideal of selective higher education admissions is now deeply entrenched in American society. Today’s most selective colleges and
universities essentially ascribe to a theory very similar to the one that
prompted Harvard to first use SAT scores as admissions criterion—
the theory that individuals’ scores on tests like the SAT should be

113

114

115

116

KARABEL, supra note 27, at 140 (“With each additional group of National Scholars who
compiled outstanding records, it seemed increasingly clear that it was possible, with the
assistance of the new science of psychometrics, to predict which applicants would prove to
be brilliant scholars.”); LEMANN, supra note 31, at 39 (stating that eight of the ten Harvard
National Scholars for the class of 1938 were elected to Phi Beta Kappa).
KARABEL, supra note 27, at 177 (“Of the 10 recipients who graduated in 1938, 5 graduated
summa cum laude, 3 magna cum laude, 2 cum laude, and 8 were elected to Phi Beta
Kappa.”). But see id. (explaining that Harvard scholarship students were required to
maintain a high GPA in order to keep their scholarship and remain in college). The
academic success of the National Scholars might also be attributed to the fact that, during
the 1930s and 1940s, college academics were far less competitive at elite private schools
like Harvard than is the case today. See id. at 21 (noting that Harvard’s student culture
was “largely hostile to academic exertion”). Except for less affluent students attending
such schools on scholarships, most “Harvard men” were competing to achieve high positions in non-academic, extracurricular clubs and teams. See id. at 17 (“[T]he academic
side of the college experience ranked a distant third behind club life and campus activities.”).
See id. at 198, 266, 425 (describing the pressure on Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to admit
students based on SAT scores). The rationale that drove other elite institutions to adopt
the SAT as an admissions criterion still resonates today—the SAT is a more uniform, thus
more fair, basis for comparing students from various parts of the country who attend
schools of varying quality than high school grades or assessments of students’ mastery of
specific subject matter that may not have been taught at their high school.
Id. at 198. On December 14, 1941, Harvard and other elite private colleges established a
policy requiring the SAT for all applicants, not just scholarship candidates. Id. at 178.
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considered as an admissions criterion because of the capacity of the
SAT to predict test-takers’ future grades. Psychometricians now regularly produce institution-specific validity studies—studies that compare the entering SAT scores of admitted students—and institutionspecific regression equations that reflect the statistical relationship
117
between SAT scores and first-year grades.
The “correlation coefficient,” r, between the SAT and college performance is derived by
comparing an accepted student’s SAT score with his or her overall
GPA at the end of the freshman year of college. The square of the
2
correlation coefficient, the “coefficient of determination” (r ), is a
measure of the strength of the SAT’s capacity to predict that a higherscoring test-taker will have higher grades in college than a lowerscoring test-taker.
B. Utility and Racial Problems of Factorist Tests: The SAT Example
Selective public and private universities still operate according to
the principle that led Conant to adopt the SAT as an admissions criterion for Harvard National Scholars in the 1930s—that the great
benefit of factorist admissions tests like the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and
MCAT is the incremental improvement in prediction they contribute
to admissions decision-making as compared to relying on non-test cri118
As further explained in this section which again
teria exclusively.
uses the SAT as an example, inclusion of the SAT as an admissions
criterion increases the percentage of “variation” in test-takers’ future
college grades explained (or predicted) from approximately 18% relying on high school grades alone to roughly 23% if both SAT scores
and high school grades are considered. During the century that factorist tests have been in existence, it has been this incremental im117

118

How institutions use such equations varies dramatically. If they so choose, institutions
can use their institution-specific regression equation to develop an equation for combining an applicant’s SAT score with his or her high school GPA—a numerical composite
index score which can be used to compare and rank applicants quantitatively. Although
the high school GPA of applicants is more predictive of college success (defined by firstyear grades) than SAT scores alone, many studies have found that relying on a combination of SAT and high school GPA is more predictive than using high school GPA alone.
See, e.g., REBECCA ZWICK, FAIR GAME?: THE USE OF STANDARDIZED ADMISSIONS TESTS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 79–90 (2002).
The GRE, LSAT, and MCAT play a similar role in graduate, law, and medical school admissions. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN:
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 40 (1997) (showing the relationship
between LSAT scores and first-year law student GPAs); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to
Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a
Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (examining the role
the LSAT and grades play in law school admissions).
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provement in predictive power that has justified their continued use
in selective admissions.
However, another long-standing characteristic has plagued traditional factorist tests since their creation—the consistent and statistically significant differences in the averaged factorist test scores of cer119
tain racial groups. Lack of certainty as to the explanations for the
racial differences in factorist test scores combined with the controversial tenet ascribed to by many g-oriented intelligence theorists that
120
such differences are hereditary and virtually immutable have led
some to question the fairness of factorist tests as admissions criteria.
The fact that the averaged test scores of African-American and Latino
students is lower than the averaged scores of Asian-American and
white students often lead to accusations that considering factorist test
scores in selective admissions unfairly excludes otherwise qualified
African Americans and Latinos. Conversely, rejected whites point to
the fact that the averaged scores of some admitted African Americans
and Latinos are lower than the averaged scores of white students to
claim that selective universities unfairly rely less on factorist test
121
scores in assessing such applicants.
1. Modern Predictive Power of the SAT
Today, the major appeal of mental testing, particularly selective
higher education admissions testing, is that it confers a degree of
scientific credibility to the process of comparing individuals’ intellectual abilities that is lacking when admissions decisions are based solely on grades and other non-test criteria. Though long criticized for
doing little more than measuring differences in test-takers’ social and
economic opportunities, a major reason that standardized tests like
119

120

121

Whites as a racial group have, on average, higher scores on conventional factorist admissions tests than certain non-white racial groups including African-Americans, Latinos and
some subcategories of the Asian American racial group. Although it is not true of all categories of Asian Americans, some Asian racial groups score higher than whites on some
standardized admissions tests. CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 125–26 (discussing “substantial Asian superiority in academic achievement tests (e.g. grades and
achievement tests, such as the SAT)”).
See, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (arguing that American society is divided
into a cognitive elite and cognitive underclass based on IQ scores resulting from hereditable genetic disadvantages that cannot be overcome by public policy inverventions). But
see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & MEREDITH PHILLIPS, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 6–12
(1998) (compiling various studies concluding the black-white test score gap is not genetic
in origin but instead the result of the cultural, economic, and educational differences
among racial groups).
See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT have maintained their prominence
as admission criteria is the fact that psychometricians—measurement
psychologists—have consistently produced statistical evidence that
such tests are scientific predictors of test-takers’ future performance at
122
the educational institutions to which they apply.
The basis upon
which standardized tests offer this scientific support of admissions
decisions is the statistical correlation that psychometricians have
found between test-takers’ scores on admissions tests and their actual
123
grades in college, graduate, and professional schools.
To a large extent, it is the statistical correlation between testtakers’ scores on admissions tests and test-takers’ first-year grades—
the “predictive power” of admissions tests—that forms the scientific
justification for treating applicants’ test scores as useful proxies for
admissions-related merit. Studies of the correlation between testtakers’ SAT scores and early college performance consistently have
124
been found to be statistically significant.
The statistical principles
that inform test score use are the basis for the conclusion that there is
a relationship between SAT scores and future grades that cannot be
explained by chance alone. Yet, although college grades and SAT
125
scores are correlated, that correlation is far from perfect and not as
122

123

124

125



See, e.g., Linda S. Gottfredson & James Crouse, Validity Versus Utility of Mental Tests: Example of the SAT, 29 J. VOCATIONAL. BEHAV. 363, 365–66 (1986) (describing Crouse’s longitudinal studies’ conclusions that aptitude tests predict later academic performance). More
precisely, the practical utility of college and graduate school admissions tests is the extent
to which scores on such tests are “correlated” to test-takers’ first-year grades at a particular
educational institution. See discussion supra Part I.
It is worth noting that the most commonly used “outcome criterion”—test-takers’ firstyear grades—is regularly criticized as having little practical significance. See, e.g., WestFaulcon, supra note 5, at 1116 (“The Educational Testing Service . . . reports that a high
school student’s SAT score explains approximately thirteen percent of the variance in
first-year college grades, less than would be explained if universities relied on high-school
grades alone.”). In fact, researchers have gone to great lengths to identify more “construct valid” and practically significant outcomes. See generally, Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: A New Assessment for Use in Law School Admissions
Decisions 77, 80–81 (July 31, 2009), CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies Paper (describing the development of an assessment test designed to predict postlaw school “lawyer effectiveness” instead of first-year grades, the criterion predicted by the
LSAT).
See, e.g., ZWICK, supra note 117, at 85–86 (finding a correlation of .36 when using only the
SAT as a predictor). SAT scores can be fairly said to correlate to test-takers’ first-year GPA
and also, but to a lesser degree, test-takers’ later college performance (GPA after the
freshman year). Id.
If the SAT were a perfect predictor of test-takers’ future grades in college, universities
would be able to predict an individual’s grades smply by knowing his or her SAT score.
See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1995) (making similar observation about the relationship between employment test scores and employees’ performance ratings). Whenever a
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good as the correlation between high school grades and college
126
grades.
The SAT’s “practical predictive power”—the percentage of variation in test-takers’ first-year grades that is explained by test-takers’
2
SAT scores—is the “squared correlation coefficient” (r ). Because
SAT scores explain approximately 13% of the variance in first-year
127
college grades, as much as 87% of the variation in scholastic success
during the first year of college is not explained by an individual’s SAT
128
score. In other words, the fact that the SAT college admissions test,

126

127

128



correlation between two variables is less than perfect, using one of those two variables to
predict the other will result in errors. Id. at n.42 (describing false negatives as misclassifications). Statistical theory uses the terms “false positive” and “false negative” to describe
the instances where the presumed relationship between the variables is not present—in
the context of mental testing, when rank-order differences in test scores do not translate
into better relative academic performance. Id. An applicant is a “false positive” if his or
her actual performance falls short of what is normally expected of someone with a high
SAT score. Id. In the reverse, a “false negative” is an applicant whose SAT score is too
low to qualify him or her for admission but who, if admitted, would succeed academically
at a level that far exceeds SAT-based expectations. Id. In comparing the predictive accuracy or predictive power of two tests that are otherwise equally reliable, the test that results in the fewest false positives and fewest false negatives is a better predictive tool. Id.
Admissions tests explain even smaller percentages of the variation in applicants’ later college grades (e.g. GPA at graduation). Atkinson & Geiser, supra note 4, at 672 (“[T]here
is little difference among the major national tests in their ability to predict student performance in college.”).
See ZWICK, supra note 117, at 116 tbl.5-2. Because of the large number and wide variation
in studies of the SAT’s predictive effectiveness, and the fact that testing experts disagree
as to whether correlation coefficients should be “corrected” to compensate for “restriction of range,” see Selmi supra note 125, at 1266–67, reported correlations between SAT
scores and grades vary from 0.36 to as high as 0.65. See ZWICK, supra note 117, at 84–86.
Zwick reports the results of an ETS report that finds an overall correlation of SAT verbal
and math with college GPA of 0.36 and an overall correlation of high school GPA with
2
college GPA of 0.39. Id. at 116. The percentage of the variation (r ) in college GPA explained is calculated by squaring the correlation coefficient (r) and multiplying by 100.
Id.
In that same study, test-takers’ overall high school GPA by itself explained roughly 16%—
more than SAT score—but still left 84% of variation in early college grades unexplained.
The fact that students’ high school GPA is consistently a better predictor of both their
freshman and four-year college grades has led to repeated challenges of the incremental
predictive value of the SAT as an admissions criterion. See, e.g., Saul Geiser & Maria Veronica Santelices, Validity of High School Grades in Predicting Student Success Beyond the Freshman Year: High-School Record vs. Standardized Tests as Indicators of Four-Year College Outcomes,
CTR. FOR STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUC. 1, 1 (2007), http://cshe.berkeley.edu
/publications/docs/ROPS.GEISER._SAT_6.13.07.pdf (“High-school grades are often
viewed as an unreliable criterion for college admissions, owing to differences in grading
standards across high schools, while standardized tests are seen as methodologically rigorous, providing a more uniform and valid yardstick for assessing student ability and
achievement. The present study challenges that conventional view.”); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
953, 974 (1996) (“It is widely recognized that high school grades are more predictive of
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considered alone, explains approximately 13% of the variation in a
test-taker’s college grades means that, of the factors that contribute to
which freshmen have higher or lower GPAs at the end of their first
year, the SAT explains 13% and the other 87% of what explains why
applicants perform better academically relative to one another is left
unaccounted for and unexplained by consideration of applicants’
129
SAT score by itself.
When, as is typically the practice of universities, both high school
GPA and SAT scores are considered together, more of the variation
in the differences in freshman college grades is explained. Even
when a factorist test like the SAT is used in conjunction with high
school grades to predict college performance, over 70% of the variance is unaccounted for and unexplained. Universities have generally made the policy judgment that having some scientific basis for

129

college freshman-year grades than the SAT. Perhaps even more significant is the extremely small increase in predictiveness gained by using the SAT in conjunction with high
school grades.”). Critics also point to studies that consistently find the correlation between white test-takers’ scores to be higher than the correlations for non-whites as proof
that the SAT predicts less well for non-whites. Nevertheless, most psychologists are of the
view that the predictive effectiveness of the SAT is similar for different racial groups. See,
e.g., The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322 (“[T]he predictive effectiveness of the SATC[ombined Score] varies from the highest (.64) for White students to the lowest (.50) for
Native American students, with Asian American (.63), Black (.62), and Hispanic (.53)
students taking intermediate positions in the order specified here.”). A major reason why
selective institutions rely on the SAT as opposed to relying exclusively on applicants’ prior
grades is a concern over the lack of scientific reliability of high school grades: teachers’
grading criteria are believed to be highly variable and inconsistent. Thus, it is often argued that the SAT and other standardized admissions tests serve as a critical check on
grades without which grades might eventually become useless as admissions criteria; the
fact that students take national, standardized admissions tests discourages teachers from
unjustifiably inflating students’ grades to increase their college admissions prospects. See,
e.g., West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1114 (“The SAT remains such a prominent criterion in
college admissions because of its unique capacity to provide a standardized national
yardstick for comparing students from high schools across the country . . . .”); see also
ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: JUSTICE,
POLITICS, AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 119 (2004) (“What a standardized test such as the
SAT I or the ACT provides is an objective measure based on a comprehensive national
cross-section of college-goers.”).
See, e.g., ZWICK, supra note 117, at 85 (calculating standardized tests’ predictive effectiveness). Zwick states:
The regression analysis using only high school GPA as a predictor yielded a moderately high correlation of .39 [fifteen percent of the variation in college grades];
using only the SAT produced a correlation of .36. When high school GPA, SAT
math, and SAT verbal scores were used in combination, the correlation rose to .48
[twenty three percent of the variation in college grades], yielding an ‘SAT increment’ of .09 (.48 minus .39). These findings parallel the results of many other test
validity analyses in two basic ways. First, prior grades alone were slightly more effective in predicting subsequent grades than were admissions test scores alone.
Second, adding test scores to prior grades improved the prediction.
Id. at 85–86.
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admissions decisions is better than relying solely on non-test criteria.
A major rationale for relying on standardized admissions tests in addition to prior grades is their incremental predictive power when considered in combination with applicants’ grades. In the context of selective college admissions, taking SAT scores into account in addition
to high school GPA adds an increment of about six to eight percen130
tage points to the percentage points of variation in applicants’ firstyear college grades explained by high school grades considered
131
alone.
Thus, at the end of the roughly hundred-year period that massmarketed standardized tests have been in existence, their predictive
132
power still leaves substantial room for improvement. College and
graduate school admissions tests measure only a relatively small portion of the differences in test-takers’ future academic success and,
thus, possess far less than perfect (100%) predictive power; their predictive power still leaves substantial room for improvement because
they leave more of the variation in intelligence and future academic
success unexplained than they actually explain. Accordingly, the
strength of prediction possible using SAT scores along with grades
133
suggests a need for further innovation in testing.

130

131

132

133

Using Zwick's data, my calculation of 23% of the variation in college grades as explained
when SAT scores are considered in combination with high school grades (based on the
2
correlation (r) of .48 and coefficient of determination (r ) of .23) is 8% higher than the
15% of the variation in college grades explained by SAT scores when considered alone
2
(based on the correlation (r) of .39 and coefficient of determination (r ) of .15). See, e.g.,
ZWICK, supra note 117, at 85–86 (“The regression analysis using only high school GPA as a
predictor yielded a moderately high correlation of .39; using only the SAT produced a
correlation of .36. When high school GPA, SAT math, and SAT verbal scores were used
in combination, the correlation rose to .48 . . . .”); Atkinson & Geiser, supra note 4, at 666
(“In our studies at the University of California, for example, we have found that admissions tests add an increment of about 6 percentage points to the explained variance in
cumulative college GPA . . . .”).
Although it is not the focus of this Article, the fact that such a small percentage of incremental prediction is gained by relying on admissions tests could be the basis of a policy
argument that universities should not rely on them or a legal argument that such reliance
is not an “educational necessity.” See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1126–28 (“[J]udges
might be persuaded that the SAT has limited value in assessing college performance ability when the vast majority of an institution’s applicants have stellar academic credentials.”).
Atkinson & Geiser, supra note 4, at 672 (stating that “[a]fter decades of predictive validity
studies, our best models still account for only about 25% to 30% of the variance in outcome measures such as college GPA”).
See Atkinson & Geiser, supra note 4, at 672 (“Our ability to predict student performance
in college on the basis of factors known at point of admission remains relatively limited.”).
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2. Differences in Averaged SAT Scores of Racial Groups
When the SAT scores of members of racial groups are averaged,
numerous studies have found significant differences in those aver134
ages.
While their added contribution to the prediction of applicants’ future academic performance is essentially the greatest benefit
offered by factorist tests as an admissions criterion, the fact that racial
groups, on average, perform differently on such tests has long
prompted questions as to whether their use is of sufficient net substantive value to justify their impact on lower-scoring racial groups.
The impact of the racial gap in scores on factorist tests like the SAT is
exacerbated by the fact that the size of the gap is significant and is
characteristic of virtually all factorist tests.
Research studies have found the averaged score of AfricanAmerican test-takers on the SAT is about one full standard deviation
135
lower than the averaged score of white test-takers.
The averaged

134

135



The meaning of measured racial differences in test scores should take into account the
fact that “that there is disagreement as to whether race is a biologically meaningful concept.” CIANCIOLO & STERENBERG, supra note 3, at 121. “An alternative to the biological
approach is to define race as a social construct rooted in historical and anthropological
context.” James L. Outtz & Daniel A. Newman, A Theory of Adverse Impact, in ADVERSE
IMPACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES SELECTION 57–
58 (James Outzz ed., 2010) (describing authors’ agreement with “the premise that race is
a social construct” and their conceptualization of race “to include group-level shared perceptions/meanings, resulting from common societal experiences, as well as individuallevel constructs (e.g. unique personal meanings drawn from the common experience)”).
See The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322 (“[I]n comparison with White Students on
average, African American students scored about one full SD [standard deviation] lower . . . .”). Studies have found similar differences in LSAT scores. See, e.g., LINDA F.
WIGHTMAN & DAVID G. MULLER, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, AN ANALYSIS OF
DIFFERENTIAL VALIDITY AND DIFFERENTIAL PREDICTION FOR BLACK, MEXICAN-AMERICAN,
HISPANIC, AND WHITE LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS 9 tbl.6a (1990) (comparing the means and
standard deviations of LSAT scores and GPAs for whites and African Americans); Lempert, et. al., supra note 11, at 244 (reviewing Steven T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McClosckey’s
book on statistical significance which provides data on racial differences on the LSAT);
William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950–2000, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 1 (2003) (discussing generally the history of law school admissions and the LSAT as it
applies to different racial groups); Linda F. Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness:
Revisiting Prediction Models with Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 244–45
(2003) (discussing the difference in LSAT scores between white and African American
applicants); Wightman, supra note 118, at 36 (“The black students in this sample came to
law school with UGPAs that are, on average, one standard deviation below those of white
students and LSAT scores that average more than one-and-a-half standard deviations below.”); see also JENCKS & PHILLIPS, supra note 120, at 1–51 (discussing generally the gap between black and white standardized test scores from kindergarten through adulthood);
William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and
Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975, 978 (2004) (“The LSAT also

June 2011]

INTELLIGENT DESIGN

1271

Latino SAT score is slightly lower than one standard deviation (0.9)
136
less than the white averaged score. The Native-American averaged
SAT score is about half (0.5) a standard deviation lower than the av137
eraged white score.
In contrast, the averaged score of Asian students (not disaggregating particular Asian subgroups) is slightly
higher, by 0.2 standard deviation, than the white average—averaged
Asian SAT scores are higher than the white averaged scores on SAT
138
math tests but lower on SAT verbal and writing tests. Multiple explanations for the racial differences in factorist test scores have been
suggested: cultural, economic, and hereditary differences among ra139
cial groups, the psychological impact of racial stereotypes about in140
tellectual differences among racial groups, and racially disparate
impacts of test development procedures and item selection
141
processes have all been identified as factors that may contribute to
“the racial gap” in factorist test scores. Significantly, the next Part describes recent research designed to define and measure intelligence
more completely than g-based theories that has spawned tests with
smaller racial gaps in scores and greater predictive power than the

136

137

138

139
140

141

presents a special set of problems for minority students, who have historically posted significantly lower scores than their white counterparts.”).
See, e.g., The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322 (“When all SAT scores were aggregated . . . in comparison with White students . . . Latino students scored 0.9 SD [standard
deviation] lower . . . .”). Studies have shown similar results with LSAT scores. See, e.g.,
Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness, supra note 135, at 245 tbl.8 (listing the differences in standard deviations of LSAT scores of Hispanic and white law school applicants).
See, e.g., The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322 (“Native Americans scored about half a
SD [standard deviation] lower [than white students].”). For similar differences in LSAT
scores, see, for example, Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness, supra note 135, at
245 tbl.8 (showing the differences in standard deviations of LSAT scores between white
and Native American law school applicants).
The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322 (“[Asian students] scored higher than White
students by about .03 (SAT I) to .07 (SAT II) SDs [standard deviations] on the math tests,
but about a third (SAT I) to half a (SAT II) SD [standard deviation] lower on the verbal/writing tests.”).
See, e.g., supra note 120.
See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 613 (1997) (describing research studies finding that “societal stereotypes about groups can influence the intellectual functioning and identity development of individual group members”); see also CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING
VIVALDI: AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 4 (2010) (“[B]y imposing
on us certain conditions of life, our social identities can strongly affect things as important as our performances in the classroom and on standardized tests . . . .”).
William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-In Headwinds”: An Educational
and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 122–134 (2002) (describing how the manner in which SAT questions are developed and selected contributes
to the significant disparate impact the SAT has on African-American and Latino testtakers).
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more racially-skewed conventional factorist tests—an improvement in
the technology of mental testing.
III. NEW UNDERSTANDINGS OF INTELLIGENCE: ABOVE AND BEYOND “g”
The theory of successful intelligence provides one basis for improving
prediction and possibly for establishing greater group equity. It suggests that
broadening the range of skills tested to go beyond the analytical and
memory skills typically tapped by the SAT, to include practical and creative
skills as well, might significantly enhance the prediction of college
performance beyond current levels.
....
The SAT is based on a conventional psychometric notion of cognitive
skills . . . . But perhaps the time has come to move beyond conventional
theories of cognitive skills . . . . [T]he triarchic measures alone
approximately double the predicted amount of variance in college GPA
when compared with the SAT alone . . . .
—Robert J. Sternberg

142

Modern theories of intelligence can be very roughly grouped into
143
two categories—modern g-oriented theories of intelligence and
modern theories of intelligence rejecting (or, at least, not dependent
upon) the existence of “g.” A broad range of non-factorist theories of
intelligence conceive of intelligence as comprised of something more
than or other than “g.” These non-g-based theories, such as the CHC
theory of cognitive abilities, Sternberg’s triarchic theory, the PASS
Theory, and Multiple Intelligence Theory purport to define intelli144
gence more completely than the conventional g-based theory.
142
143

144



The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322, 344 (citation omitted).
In the later twentieth century, Charles Spearman’s original g-based theory of intelligence
has been updated. These modern factorist theories of intelligence still place the “g” general factor at the top of tiered structures of mental abilities as the most significant factor.
Two of the most prominent modern hierarchical psychometric theories of intelligence
are Vernon and Cattell’s theory, introduced in 1971, that divides “g” into “fluid” and
“crystallized” intelligence and Carroll’s “three stratum” theory, set forth in 1993, that
places “g” general intelligence in “Stratum III”—at the top of a three-tier hierarchy of
mental abilities. CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 6–8.
Goldstein et al., supra note 82, at 102–09 (describing such theories). However, the debate
over the correctness of multi-dimensional versus g-centered theories of intelligence is ongoing. For critiques of Sternberg’s and other alternative theories, see Linda S. Gottfredson, Practical Intelligence in Everyday Life, 29 INTELLIGENCE 363, 363–65 (2001) (book review) (arguing that the research approach employed was flawed); Arthur R. Jensen, Test
Validity: g versus “Tacit Knowledge,” 2 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 9, 9 (1993)
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Modern research on intelligence has resulted in the development
of tests that do a better job than traditional g-based factorist tests of
145
Plus, that greater prepredicting test-takers’ future performance.
dictive power comes with an added bonus—smaller racial group dif146
ferences in scores on such tests. The increasingly large body of intelligence research described in this Part increases selective
universities’ vulnerability to the type of Title VI test deficiency admin147
istrative complaints introduced in Part I of this Article and ex148
amined further below.
A. Critiques of “g”
The conception of intelligence as “multi-dimensional” predates
149
Influential psychologists who disagreed
Spearman’s theory of “g.”
with Spearman’s conception of intelligence as “g” included American
psychologist Louis L. Thurstone who conceived intelligence as com150
prised of seven distinct but interrelated factors and Joy Paul Guilford who, rejecting “g,” proposed that intelligence involved over one
151
hundred different factors.
Presently, some modern intelligence
experts assert that g-oriented factorist theories of intelligence have
152
been seriously flawed from their inception.
A central critique of the factorist approach to describing the nature of intelligence is that it offers no empirical—only a mathemati-

145
146

147
148
149

150
151
152

(“There is no longer any question that g is a large component of virtually every measure
that validly predicts training outcomes and proficiency on the job in a wide variety of occupations.”); Malcolm James Ree & James A. Earles, g Is to Psychology What Carbon Is to
Chemistry: A Reply to Sternberg and Wagner, McClelland, and Calfee, 2 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
IN PSYCHOL. SCI., 11, 11–12 (1993) (arguing that Sternberg and his colleagues made methodological errors in their work).
See infra Part III.B.
See The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 321 (describing how his theory was used “as a basis to provide supplementary assessment of analytical skills, as well as tests of practical and
creative skills, to augment the SAT in predicting college performance”).
See supra Part I.C.
See infra Part IV.
Cianciolo & Sternberg, supra note 3, at 6 (“The idea that there exists multiple intellectual
capabilities, and that people can have different patterns of strengths and weaknesses in
these abilities, dates at least as far back as the sixteenth century.” (citation omitted)).
Soon after it was first articulated, intelligence experts began challenging the notion of intelligence as “g.” Id. at 3-6.
Id.
Id.
For example, it is the view of cognitive theorists such as Robert Sternberg that psychometricians have never proven that the “g” general factor of intelligence actually exists. See,
e.g., ROBERT J. STERNBERG & ELENA L. GRIGORENKO, THE GENERAL FACTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE: HOW GENERAL IS IT? (2002) (discussing various factorist theories).
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153

cal—basis for describing intelligence. An additional flaw of the mathematical process of factor analysis according to its critics is the fact
that different psychometricians have used it to reach drastically different conclusions as to the number of factors of intelligence—some
factorists have concluded that the human mind has as few as two factors while other factorists have used the same method and found as
154
many as 120 mental factors.
Today, factor analysis can be contrasted with more empirically-oriented cognitive psychology approaches to intelligence theory. Unlike factorist theories of intelligence, cognitive theories conceive intelligence as “cognitive
155
processes” and seek to observe and measure intelligent behavior in
the real world.
Beyond its mathematical focus, the g-oriented factorist theory of
intelligence is also subject to particular criticism because it ultimately
156
defines “g” as what g-oriented factorist tests measure and because
the only criterion for a test to be deemed a measure of “g” under the
psychometric perspective is that its score results align with the pre157
conceived g-oriented hypothesis about the nature of intelligence.
The essentially trial and error experimentation by which the components of early g-loaded tests were selected—retaining test questions
158
and arrays when their results correlated to other g-loaded tests —is

153
154

155
156

157

158



Id.
See CIANCIOLO & STERNBERG, supra note 3, at 62 (contrasting Guilford’s “structure of intellect” theory that posited 120 distinct abilities with Spearman’s g-oriented two-factor approach).
Goldstein et al., supra note 82, at 105.
For example, “g” has been explained as follows:
Suffice it to say now that in psychometry, intelligence is equated with this general
ability or g the factor common to all problem-solving abilities. Since the best intelligence tests are deliberately constructed to measure this g factor it does make
sense to define intelligence as what intelligence tests measure, provided that the g
factor can be specified.
KLINE, supra note 8, at 3-4.
See JEFFREY M. BLUM, PSEUDOSCIENCE AND MENTAL ABILITY: THE ORIGINS AND FALLACIES
OF THE IQ CONTROVERSY 61 (1978) (“[W]e may speculate that belief in IQ tests
rested . . . on the fact that comparison of different ethnic groups produced results which
confirmed the expectations and prejudices of respectable white, middle-class Americans.
The 1917 army data firmly established that blacks on the average scored a full standard
deviation (about 15 IQ points) below whites.”); Goldstein et. al., supra note 82, at 112
(describing haphazard approach to creation of subtests and research and concluding that
this “will likely lead to contamination as well given that subtests may be included or overemphasized that do not reflect the intelligence construct”); see also id. at 118–19 (describing the “Spearman hypothesis” as the “most controversial tenet of the psychometric perspective”).
See, e.g., Goldstein et al., supra note 82, at 109–27 (discussing how the “rigorous and complex” criteria for designing construct-valid tests does not “characterize the picture painted
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demonstrative of the circuitous logic and weak empirical and theoretical underpinnings of the psychometric perspective that have led to
modern efforts to replace or augment the theory of “g.”
B. Examples of Innovation in Intelligence Theory and Testing
Strikingly, the research of modern intelligence theorists and testing experts has revealed that conventional g-based standardized tests
are not as predictive of test-takers’ future performance as tests designed according to non-g-based theories. Seeking to test the hypothesis that at least some of the racial differences in factorist tests
scores do not reflect actual racial differences in test-takers’ intelligence and future academic success, these researchers have undertaken “efforts to develop valid tests of intelligence with reduced racial
159
differences.” The thinking behind such research is that, in contrast
to conventional g-oriented testing, “tests developed based on [more]
sound theory could result in reducing deficiency- and contaminationrelated factors that might contribute to racial differences observed
160
[in test scores].” By designing “more theoretically based tests such
as those that focus on measuring key factors of intelligence (e.g., fluid reasoning, general memory and learning),” modern intelligence
theorists believe it is possible to create tests that both do a better job
of measuring intelligence and that demonstrate “lower racial differ161
ences” in scores.
For instance, when revised “to better fit” the dimensions of the in162
telligence theory of pscyhologist John Carroll, traditional intelligence tests such as the Woodcock-Johnson III, Stanford-Binet 5, and
WISC-IV tests had significantly decreased racial differences in scores
163
without decreasing these tests’ capacity to measure intelligence. Instead of the one standard deviation typically reported as the differ-

159

160
161
162
163

by the psychometric perspective when it comes to designing valid measures of intelligence”).
Goldstein, supra note 82, at 124. Some have done this by designing tests that disentangle
test-takers’ culture and language from intelligence. See, e.g., Freedle, How Standardized
Tests Systematically Underestimate African Americans’ True Verbal Ability, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
183, 183-205 (2006); M. Helms-Lorenz, Cross-Cultural Differences in Cognitive Performance
and Spearman’s Hypothesis: g or c? 31 INTELLIGENCE 9–20 (2003); Fagan & Holland, Racial
Eqality in Intelligence: Predictions from a Theory of Intelligence as Processing, 35 INTELLIGENCE
319–334 (2007).
Goldstein, supra note 82, at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
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ence between the scores of African-American and white test-takers,
revisions to the tests that aligned with Carroll’s well-regarded intelligence theory substantially reduced the gap between AfricanAmerican and white test scores. Instead of one standard deviation
between the scores of the two racial groups, the difference was cut in
165
almost half in some instances to 0.54.
Another example of innovation in mental testing is the Cognitive
Assessment System (“CAS”) designed based on the PASS theory of in166
telligence.
PASS is a cognitive model of intelligence focused on
performance that delineates four main factors as “the cognitive build167
ing blocks of human intellectual functioning.”
The CAS test is an
intelligence test for children and adolescents that is predictive of testtakers’ achievement in school settings. Although similar to traditional intelligence tests, the CAS test shows “much lower racial differenc168
es than found with other traditional tests of intelligence.”
In contrast to the often reported one standard deviation between AfricanAmerican and white test-takers, the CAS test designed according to
the PASS theory of intelligence has been reported to have a blackwhite score difference of only 0.26 standard deviation—only a little
more than one-fourth the size of the racial gap typically reported for
169
g-oriented intelligence tests.
Also notable is the fact that similar innovations are taking place in
the development of employment tests. The Siena Reasoning Test
(“SRT”), designed based on the intelligence theory of Joseph Fa170
gan, has predictive power “equal to or better than” traditiona gbased cognitive tests and consistently has significantly smaller racial
differences in scores—“yielding, for example, black-white mean differences that ranged from approximately 0.00 [no racial difference
whatsoever] to 0.40 standard deviation [less than half the traditional
171
black-white difference on g-based tests].”
164
165

166
167

168

169
170
171

See supra Part II.C.
Goldstein, supra 82, at 124 (“In fact, Wasserman and Becker reported racial differences
below the 1 SD typically reported for some mainstream tests (e.g., black-white SD differences . . . . ranged from 0.54 to 0.73).”).
Id. at 125.
Id.; see also Jack A. Naglieri & J.P. Das, Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, Successive (PASS)
Theory: A Revision of the Conept of Intelligence, in CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT:
THEORIES, TESTS, AND ISSUES 120–35 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 2005).
Goldstein, supra note 82, at 125; see also Jack A. Naglieri & J.P. Das, The Cognitive Assessment
System, in CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT: THEORIES, TESTS, AND ISSUES 441–
60 (Dawn P. Flanagan & Patti L. Harrison eds., 2005).
Goldstein, supra note 82, at 125.
Id. at 127.
Id.
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Lastly and particularly relevant to the analysis in this Article, similar research has also been undertaken in the context of college admissions testing. Psychologist Robert Sternberg’s project with the
College Board produced similar findings when he better fitted the
SAT to a multi-dimensional theory of intelligence—his own triarchic
theory. The new college admissions test had increased power to predict test-takers’ future performance and reduced racial differences as
172
compared to the comparable g-based SAT college admissions test.
C. A More Intelligent College Admissions Test?
Whereas traditional factorist definitions of intelligence conceptualize intelligence as structured around the “g” general factor, Robert Sternberg’s theory defines “successful intelligence” as comprised
of three quantifiable mental abilities or intelligences: analytical intel173
ligence, practical intelligence, and creative intelligence. Measuring
“analytic intelligence” is a quantification of the application of abilities
174
to relatively “familiar problems” of an “abstract nature.” As defined
under the triarchic theory, analytical intelligence is involved when
skills are used to analyze, evaluate, judge or compare and contrast.
“Practical intelligence” involves “skills used to implement, apply, or
175
put into practice ideas in real-world contexts.” Sternberg describes
practical intelligence as the utilization of “tacit knowledge”—
knowledge that one is “not explicitly taught” and that is often “not
even verbalized” but that is necessary to work “effectively” in an envi176
ronment. Lastly, the theory asserts that “creative intelligence” is the
172
173

174

175
176



Id. at 126(describing Sternberg’s Rainbow Project and findings).
Sternberg’s triarchic theory does not view intelligence as a fixed set of abilities which distinguishes it from Charles Spearman’s work identifying a number of “specific factors,”
Thurstone’s seven multiple factors, or Howard Gardner’s eight or nine multiple intelligences. See Kristin Garrigan & Jonathan Plucker, New and Emerging Theories of Intelligence,
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, http://www.indiana.edu/~intell/emerging.shtml (last modified
July 25, 2007) (describing Sternberg’s conceptions of intelligence). Instead, the three intelligences of triarchic theory are perpetually developing abilities. Id.
See The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 324–25 (“Analytical intelligence involves skills
used to analyze, evaluate, judge, or compare and contrast. It is typically used when
processing components are applied to relatively familiar kinds of problems that require
abstract judgments.”).
Id. at 325.
See Robert J. Sternberg, WICS: A Model of Positive Educational Leadership, in THE ESSENTIAL
STERNBERG: ESSAYS ON INTELLIGENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EDUCATION 394 (James C.
Kaufman & Elena L. Grigorenko eds., 2009) (describing “work-related” problems used to
measure “tacit knowledge); see also id. at 395 (describing findings that tests of tacit knowledge typically show no correlation with IQ tests, but “predict performance on the job as
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application of abilities to “novel” situations and problems. Creative
intelligence is involved when “skills are used to create, invent, discov178
er, imagine, suppose or hypothesize.”
Sternberg has created both a multiple-choice test of the three aspects of intelligence conceived under his triarchic theory, Sternberg’s
179
Triarchic Abilities Test, and several types of “performance task”
tests to measure practical and creative intelligence. All of these “triarchic tests” seek to test intelligence “more broadly” in order to better predict test-takers’ future grades with less racial disparity in scores
than traditional factorist tests. In short, Sternberg’s theory is that by
measuring additional fundamental facets of intelligence—“creative”
and “practical” intelligence—as well as the “analytic” aspect of intelligence measured by traditional g-based factorist tests like the SAT, the
systems-based triarchic tests advance the technology of mental testing;
they attempt to measure mental ability more broadly and completely
than conventional standardized tests.
In a study called the “Rainbow Project,” Sternberg’s goal was to
“construct-validate” the triarchic theory of successful intelligence and
180
“also to show its usefulness in a practical prediction situation.” The
study was successful in accomplishing both goals. In the 2006 volume
of Intelligence, Sternberg reported that his contemporary systems
theory of intelligence, as operationalized in the form of the Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test and performance measures, did indeed
181
prove to be “construct valid” and “useful in increasing predictive validity, and, at the same time, in reducing ethnic group differences in
182
scores.”

177
178

179
180
181
182

well as or better than do conventional psychometric intelligence tests” and Kenyan and
Russian studies finding negative correlation between tests of practical intelligence and
tests of analytic intelligence).
Id. at 393 (“We presented 80 individuals with novel kinds of reasoning problems . . . .”).
The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 325. Creative intelligence problems ask test-takers to
write stories, create art, design advertisements and develop science products. See WICS: A
Model of Positive Educational Leadership, supra note 176, at 414 (“Individuals were asked to
create products in the realms of writing, art, advertising, and science.”). A typical creative
intelligence writing question might require the test-taker to choose from two titles, such
as “Beyond the Edge” or “The Octopus’s Sneakers,” and to write a short story based on
the title they choose. An art-related creative intelligence question might ask test-takers to
produce an art composition with either the title “The Beginning of Time” or “Earth from
an Insect’s Point of View.” Id.
See A Triarchic Analysis of an Aptitude-Treatment Interaction, in THE ESSENTIAL STERNBERG,
supra note 176, at 220 (describing the Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test).
The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id.
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The study of the “Rainbow measures”—new tests of the three intelligences conceived as constituting intelligence under the triarchic
theory—was based on data collected at fifteen schools across the
183
United States. It reported the results of regression analysis of how
much of the variation in test-takers’ college GPA—college scholastic
performance—was explained when the triarchic measures were used
in addition to high school GPA and SAT score and when the new
184
tests were used in lieu of the SAT.
The triachic tests alone were
shown to have twice the practical predictive power of the SAT
alone—“approximately double the predicted amount of variance in
2
college GPA when compared with the SAT alone (comparative r val185
ues of .199 to .098 respectively)” —and explained variation in college GPA unexplained by high school GPA and the SAT. Significantly, the Rainbow Project study also found that “the triarchic tests
appear to reduce race and ethnicity differences relative to traditional
186
assessments of abilities such as the SAT.” The study observed that:
[T]he triarchic measures predict an additional 8.9% of college GPA
beyond the initial 15.6% contributed by the SAT and high school GPA.
These findings, combined with the substantial reduction of betweenethnicity differences, make a compelling case for furthering the study of
the measurement of analytical, creative, and practical skills for predicting
187
success in college.
2

The major finding of the Rainbow Project study is that the r value
of .199 of the systems-based triarchic tests shows these new tests explaining 19.9% of the variation in the college GPA of the test-takers.
This is a significant increase over the 9.8% of the variance in college
183

184
185
186
187

See id. at 326–28. The Rainbow measures of analytical, practical, and creative abilities
used in the Rainbow Project were the Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test (“STAT”)—a
multiple choice test developed as a means of capturing test-takers’ analytical, practical,
and creative skills—and open-ended performance tasks designed to measure test-takers’
creative and practical skills. In addition to the creative skills measured by the STAT, creative tasks require test-takers to respond to a choice of topics or stimuli on which to base a
creative oral or written story or cartoon caption. Practical tasks are designed to measure
test-takers’ “ability to acquire useful knowledge from experience, including ‘tacit knowledge’ that is not explicitly taught and is often difficult to articulate, and to apply [tacit]
knowledge to solving complex everyday problems.” Id. at 328. Again, in addition to the
STAT measurement of practical skills, the Rainbow Project tests included performance
measures of practical skills—three “situational judgment inventories”[:] the Everyday
Situational Judgment Inventory (Movies), the Common Sense Questionnaire, and the
College Life Questionnaire, each of which was designed and shown to measure different
types of “tacit knowledge” understood to be a central characteristic of intelligent behavior
under the triarchic theory of successful intelligence. Id. at 329.
Id. at 329, 344.
Id. at 343–44.
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 344.
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2

grades [r value of .098] explained by the conventional factorist SAT
188
test. Noting that racial group differences in test scores are not reduced completely by the triachic tests, it is Sternberg’s conclusion
that the Rainbow Project regression studies suggest valid and reliable
tests “can be designed that reduce ethnic and socially defined racial
group differences on standardized tests, particularly for historically
189
disadvantaged groups such as blacks and Latinos.”
Sternberg also
notes that “[t]hese findings have important implications for reducing
190
adverse impact in college admissions.”
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MORE INTELLIGENT TESTS
[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other
measures to ‘predict’ academic performance is a poor substitute for a system
that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of
law. The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in
admissions there would be true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire
process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to ‘merit’ . . . . [E]xceptions to
‘true’ meritocracy give the lie to protestations that merit admissions are in
fact the order of the day at the Nation’s universities.
—Justice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger

191

Intelligence research findings that tests designed according to
multi-dimensional theories of intelligence do a better job of predicting the future college performance of test-takers than traditional factorist tests call into question the presumption that the individuals
with the highest factorist test scores possess greater admissionsrelated merit than low scorers with similar grades and other credentials. The major implication of the intelligence theory research described in this Article is that it suggests the need to rethink the role
that factorist tests currently play in selective admissions. If educational institutions rely on traditional factorist tests like the SAT without also using broader and more complete tests such as Sternberg’s
triarchic tests, rejected applicants can point to research like Sternberg’s as empirical evidence that selective universities and graduate
institutions are not using the most predictive, least racially skewed
test available; these individuals could assert that a university’s reliance
on inferior mental testing technology—tests found to be less predic188
189
190
191

See id. at 342.
Id. at 344.
Id.
539 U.S. 306, 367–68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tive of test-takers’ future grades—is an unfair and anti-meritocratic
basis for comparing applicants.
Assessing applicants based on scores on tests premised on an incomplete or flawed definition of intelligence denies them a fair opportunity to compete. In the context of tests that have a racially disparate impact on the basis of race, the test user that receives federal
funding is obligated to demonstrate the “educational necessity” of the
192
tests in question. Showing that the use of the tests is an educational
necessity requires educational institutions receiving federal funds to
demonstrate that their selection criteria (admissions tests) are accurate measures of admissions-related merit and that no less discrimina193
tory alternative measures are available.
A. Prior Legal Disputes Related to Race, Merit, and Testing
The most contentious aspects of the debate over the proper role
of standardized tests in assessing admissions-related merit is the “racial impact” of relying on tests as an admissions criterion. Lay and legal critics have long argued that the racial and eugenic views of the
men who designed the first g-based tests should be considered as evidence that their modern progeny—tests like the SAT—have inherent
194
racial, ethnic, and class biases built into their structure.
Yet, such
arguments have not ruled the day. Instead, it is the predictive power
of tests like the SAT—the attribute that psychometricians dating back
to Terman and Brigham identified long ago as noteworthy—that con-

192
193

194

West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1123–24.
See id. at 1125–28 (discussing how universities must show the use of admissions criterion
to be an “educational necessity”). In fact, the intelligence research that has been the focus of this Article suggests better, less racially skewed tests could make affirmative action
unnecessary one day in light of tests without (or with substantially smaller) racial differences in scores. Granted, it could be said that selective universities could and should, in
light of modern intelligence research, stop relying on factorist tests altogether. It could
be argued that race-conscious action to ameliorate racially differential deficiencies in the
measurement capacity of admissions tests does not trigger strict scrutiny or constitute a
compelling justification to consider race under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1630–31 (2003)
(pointing to studies showing that admissions tests do not predict performance, but
“measure quite accurately the incomes of the applicants’ parents”). It is even argued that
the entire enterprise of mental testing operates to reinforce various types of social hierarchy, including, but not limited to, racial hierarchy. See JEAN-CLAUDE CROIZET, The Racism of Intelligence: How Mental Testing Practices Have Constituted an Institutionalized Form of
Group Domination, in HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (Henry L. Gates ed.,
forthcoming Sept. 2011) (reviewing the history of mental intelligence testing and arguing
that “concepts of merit and intelligence have played a major role as control ideologies in
sustaining the long-term expropriative relationship between Blacks and Whites”).
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tinues to be the strongest argument for continued reliance on g195
based tests as admissions criteria.
That differences in racial group averages in mental test scores exist combined with the fact that there are many competing explanations for these well documented “racial gaps” in traditional mental
test scores are major reasons why the use of mental testing in selective
admissions has engendered substantial controversy and prompted
numerous legal and policy challenges. Such complaints can take
multiple forms. Rejected white applicants may accuse selective universities of “reverse discrimination” for admitting lower-scoring nonwhites in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
196
Clause and federal civil rights statutes or, in states with anti197
affirmative action laws, of operating “under-the-table affirmative action” policies that violate state laws prohibiting racial “preferences” by
198
Rejected non-whites from racial groups at the
public universities.
low end of the racial gap in conventional test scores, such as African
199
Americans, Latinos, and Filipinos, have contended that reliance on
conventional mental tests as selective admissions criteria results in unjustified disparate impact that violates federal civil rights law such as
200
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, non-whites from ra-

195

196

197
198
199
200



In the specific context of college admissions tests, the asserted predictive power is that
test-takers’ scores on admissions tests correlate to the test-takers’ future academic
achievement.
See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44 (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s
admissions decision-making process as not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003) (holding the
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions test to be in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding the petitioner’s special admission program, which admitted lower-scoring minority applicants, was unconstitutional and in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 319–20 (1974) (allowing student to make a reverse discrimination claim under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but declining to hear the merits
of the case because petitioner would be allowed to complete his final term and graduate
from the law school); see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the law school’s admissions program did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down the
Texas School of Law’s affirmative action admissions program because it was in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1086 (discussing California, Washington, Michigan, and
Nebraska state anti-affirmative action laws).
Id. at 1104 n.90.
See cases cited supra note 196.
See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525 (N.D. Cal. 1999),
settled sub nom. Castaneda v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(citing a claim brought by Latino, African American, and Filipino American college ap-
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cial groups at the high end of the racial gap in conventional test
scores, such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and some South Asian racial groups, object to changes in selective admissions policies that reduce the amount of weight given to applicants’ scores on mental tests
like the SAT as racially motivated attempts to decrease the number of
201
Asian Americans at particular elite universities.
Racial differences in admissions test scores have triggered numerous lawsuits over the past four decades. For the most part, the plaintiffs in such lawsuits have been rejected white applicants challenging
the affirmative action admissions policies of selective universities. In
those cases, white plaintiffs relied on numerical differences between
their tests scores and the test scores of admitted non-white applicants—specifically, that their higher test scores should be understood
as scientific proof of their greater admissions-related merit than lower-scoring non-white students—to argue that race-based affirmative
202
action violated their federal civil rights.
On the other hand, critics of testing allege that reliance on SAT
203
scores is undemocratic and unfairly reinforces racial and socioeco204
nomic hierarchies that disproportionately harm African-American
and Latino applicants due to those groups’ lower averaged SAT
scores. In addition, critics point to research showing that SAT scores

201

202

203

204

plicants under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in addition to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing Dworkin’s defense of affirmative action results in “negative action,” or denial of admission at
universities, to Asian-American students).
The Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence as well as
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection legal scholarship over the past four decades has
also been focused on such claims. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
293–315 (1985) (discussing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978));
Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 117 (2003) (discussing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003)); Cheryl I. Harris, What the Supreme Court Did Not Hear in Grutter and
Gratz, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 703–707 (2003) (same); Lawrence, supra note 44, at 933–34
(same). All of these authors discuss cases in which rejected white applicants claim universities’ consideration of race as an admissions criterion violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See Guinier, Admissions Rituals, supra note 202, at 116 (“At the same time that higher education is considered a democratic and educational necessity to many, it remains beyond
the reach of all but a few.”).
See Lawrence, supra note 44, at 972 (arguing for a re-examination of “merit in light of the
university’s commitment to the goal of fighting racism”); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing
the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1997) (discussing the
“radical critique of merit,” which “argues that merit standards disproportionately exclude
people of color and women because the standards historically have been developed by
members of dominant groups in ways that end up favoring them”).
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are less useful in predicting the future academic performance of ap205
In fact, proponents of raceplicants from certain racial groups.
based affirmative action often point to the academic and overall postgraduate success of racial affirmative action admits as proof that some
of the most successful minority alumni would have been denied admission if selective universities admitted strictly based on rank-order
206
test scores.
Nevertheless, arguments that g-based factorist tests are biased
against particular groups have been trumped by statistical evidence
that conventional factorist tests do, in fact, predict test-takers’ first207
year grades to some extent. The predictive capacity of g-based tests
has, from the earliest days of mass mental testing, been the bulwark
of psychometric theory. Accordingly, the longstanding policy and legal justification for relying on traditional factorist tests like the SAT
has been that such tests, despite their disproportionate exclusion of
particular non-white racial groups like African Americans, Latinos,
and Native Americans, are fair proxies for admissions-related merit
because they have been scientifically demonstrated to predict test208
takers’ future academic success.
Previously, the major empirical critique of conventional factorist
tests has been that the substantial racial and socioeconomic differences in factorist test scores do not predict the future grades of testtakers (white and non-white) with sufficient precision to counterbal205

206

207
208

See Gregg Thomson, Is the SAT a “Good Predictor” of Graduation Rates? The Failure of
“Common Sense” and Conventional Expertise and a New Approach to the Question 8
(Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting data refuting
popular notions that SAT scores strongly predict graduation rates and that African Americans admitted with lower scores have lower graduation rates).
See, e.g., Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential
Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 22 (1994) (“The literature on such standardized tests demonstrates
that they are inaccurate indicators even with respect to their limited stated objective of
predicting students’ first-year grades in college and professional school.”); Richard O.
Lempert et. al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 496 (2000) (“LSAT scores and UGPAs, the admissions
credentials that the opponents of law school affirmative action would privilege for their
supposed bearing on ‘merit’ and ‘fitness to practice law,’ bear for one school’s graduates
little if any relationship to measures of later practice success and societal contribution.”);
see also Lani Guinier, Commentary, Confirmative Action, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 565, 565
(2000) (relying on a study of the careers of non-white Michigan Law School graduates to
argue that “conventional test-based admission policies both mask and support deep flaws
in the way we allocate opportunity and privilege” by selecting applicants “who then often
fail to give back to society” and failing “to identify those who in fact have much more to
give and do give in service of the [legal] profession and its larger goals”).
See supra Part II.B.
See id.
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ance the clear statistical evidence that factorist tests are highly correlated to the test-takers’ parents’ income and education. Examples of
critics of the role that conventional tests currently play in selective
admissions include Lani Guinier and even Justice Clarence Tho209
mas. In general terms, such critiques question the predictive capacity of traditional mental tests and disagree with testing experts as to
the significance of the incremental predictive power of factorist tests.
In addition to pointing out the predictive limitations of conventional
admissions tests, legal scholars like Charles Lawrence have challenged
the objectivity of merit-based standards in selective admissions and
suggested alternative bases for allocating access to selective higher
210
education that dismantle racial and socioeconomic hierarchy.
This Article is an intervention of a different sort. Empirical evidence that systems-based tests are more predictive than conventional
factorist tests with less racially disparate impact does more than demonstrate the need to improve upon the predictive power of conventional tests. If conventional admissions tests are demonstrably less
predictive, or “less intelligent” tests, it becomes possible for rejected
applicants to argue such tests are no longer the best proxies for admissions-related merit because they make a demonstrable racial difference in admissions outcomes that could be avoided using admissions tests based on broader theories of intelligence.
This fundamentally changes the legal and policy analysis of
whether a selective university admissions policy that relies on factorist
tests is fair to non-white test-takers like African Americans and Latinos. It presents a new “test deficiency” explanation for racial differences in group averaged scores on traditional factorist tests—that the
“g” general factor intelligence theory upon which factorist tests are
211
premised is inferior to new contemporary theories of intelligence.
Hence, this argument continues, beyond there being substantial
209
210

211

See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 128, at 974 (recognizing “that high school grades are
more predictive of college freshman-year grades than the SAT”); see also supra Part I.
See Lawrence, supra note 44, at 930 (writing “as an unambivalent advocate for affirmative
action”); Harris & Narayan, supra note 206, at 25 (“[I]n circumstances in which a person’s
class, race, or gender operates as a group status that impedes equality of opportunity, we
suggest that affirmative action policies promote a greater degree of equality of opportunity than would otherwise be afforded to members of these groups.”); see also Roithmayr,
supra note 204, at 1453 (“[M]erit standards are necessarily the effect of subjective, social
and contingent race-conscious preferences for particular kinds of abilities.”). Guinier’s
scholarship might properly be placed in this category as well. See, e.g., Guinier, Confirmative Action, supra note 206.
In contrast to g-based theories, systems-based theories like the triarchic theory reject the
hereditarian theory that intelligence is distributed disproportionately and genetically to
different racial groups.
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“room for improvement” in the predictive power of traditional factorist admissions tests like the SAT, there is scientific support for the
conclusion that true racial differences in test-measured mental ability
are smaller than the more racially skewed scores of g-based factorist
tests.
B. Resolving the Tension Between Merit and Diversity
The empirical evidence that new non-factorist tests do a better job
of predicting test-takers’ future academic performance with smaller
racial group differences in test scores demonstrates the error of presuming racial diversity and academic merit are impossible to achieve
simultaneously. The assumption that applicants’ mental ability and
likelihood of future academic success align in the same rank order as
their test scores is based partly on intuition and partly on statistical
and empirical evidence. The perception that, all else being equal,
the rank-order relationship between test-takers’ scores is a fair measure of admissions-related merit is the basis upon which universities
are often criticized for rejecting applicants with high scores in favor
of lower-scoring applicants. Often, the consideration of non-test,
non-grade criteria is derided as a deviation from the fair application
of standards of academic merit, whereas consideration of standardized test scores, along with prior grades, is deemed a proper applica212
tion of conventional admissions-related merit standards.
As a consequence, the scientific rationale for treating a higher test
score as a proxy for greater admissions-related merit generally rece213
ives minimal scrutiny.
Without an explicit articulation of a rationale for deviating from them, applicant scores on mental tests like

212

213

See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 13 (1997) (defending “the accepted ideal of making decisions on the basis of merit,” but “not all the specifics of how decisions are currently made”).
By contrast, selective educational institutions’ use of “soft,” non-test, non-grade variables
and applicants’ race as factors in admissions are perceived and challenged as driven only
by ad hoc institutional preferences for particular non-academic traits, instead of a scientifically defensible theory. The problem is exacerbated because universities typically lack,
or at least fail to offer, an empirical basis for deviating from exclusive reliance on test
scores and grades as the sole basis for their admissions decisions. University leaders and
admissions officials typically fail to offer a convincing rationale for the consideration of
“soft” variables at all and, if they do, they are reluctant to share details as to the manner
and degree to which their institutions rely on “soft” versus “hard” variables. Lani Guinier
and others have critiqued this lack of “transparency” in selective higher education admissions. See, e.g., Guinier, Admissions Rituals, supra note 202, at 188.
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214

the SAT and, to a lesser extent, grades, are presumed to be scientific proof that the individual with the highest numbers has the greatest
admissions-related merit. Non-test, non-grade admissions variables
such as the extent to which an applicant has “overcome adversity” are
regularly criticized as deviations from merit principles that encourage
215
“narratives of suffering” instead of merit-based selection. Likewise,
based on similar grounds, race-based affirmative action in selective
admissions is intensely criticized for resulting in both the racially inconsistent application of test score standards and the rejection of
white applicants with higher scores than some admitted minority ap216
plicants.
As using standardized tests to allocate resources in our society becomes increasingly common, the need is heightened for an analytical
framework for evaluating the fairness and legality of particular uses of
214

215

216

Because the range and ability to draw distinctions on the basis of test scores is greater and
because of the implicit presumption that test scores are scientifically valid measures of intellectual ability and the racially disparate impact associated with reliance on tests rather
than on reliance on grades, charges that someone with a lower test score was admitted at
the expense of someone with a higher test score is perceived as more unfair than a similar
assertion based on a difference in grades.
See, e.g., Daniel Golden, To Get Into UCLA, It Helps to Face “Life Challenges”, WALL ST. J., July
12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that “the University of California adopted a new admissions system” that “awards extra credit for surmounting a wide range of personal, family or psychological obstacles—what UCLA calls life challenges”).
Rejected white applicants have alleged frequently that their constitutional and statutory
civil rights were violated because non-whites with lower test scores were admitted. See, e.g.,
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311
(2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–70 (1978); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 813 (2005); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
The now classic objection to race-based affirmative action is that race is an improper basis
for distinguishing amongst individuals and that it unjustly burdens or disadvantages individual applicants in a selection process when those particular individuals are not responsible for the racial wrongs that affirmative action is designed to remedy. Likewise, opponents of race-based affirmative action criticize universities for considering race on the
grounds that racial group affiliation is irrelevant to individual merit and, thereby, an improper consideration in affording access to elite higher education. See Antonin Scalia,
Commentary, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account
of Race”, 57 WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 147 (1979) (stating, in reference to Bakke, “I have grave
doubts about the wisdom of where we are going in affirmative action, and in equal protection generally”). Opponents also contend that affirmative action inflicts “stigmatic”
and performance harms on its beneficiaries: it causes non-beneficiaries to resent and
underestimate members of racial groups that are typically beneficiaries and suppresses
beneficiaries’ future academic and professional success. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). But despite the many objections
and policy arguments against affirmative action, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
“narrowly-tailored” race-conscious consideration of race in admissions used for the purpose of increasing an undergraduate and graduate educational institution’s multi-faceted
“diversity” is constitutional. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
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tests. Here, I suggest that a useful approach is to conceive of mental
tests as technology—neither inherently evil nor inherently infallible.
Evidence that a test user has adopted an inferior form of testing
technology is logically and, under Title VI disparate impact theory,
legally relevant to challenging or justifying a particular use of a test.
If tests like the multi-dimensional triarchic admissions tests are
more accurate predictors of future grades than conventional tests, a
new question is raised about the fairness of the role of factorist tests
in selective higher education admissions—whether basing admissions
on factorist test scores unfairly distorts the true admissions-related
merit of individual applicants and racial groups. If factorist tests are
inferior in predictive effectiveness to systems tests, there are potential
legal and policy implications that flow from a university’s failure to
either abandon factorist tests or to augment them with more predictive tests.
The core of this argument—that the legal concept of lodging a
217
“test deficiency” administrative complaint under Title VI or defending against allegations of reverse discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause—is not based on the grounds that traditional g-based
factorist tests are “culturally biased.” Instead, this approach posits
that there is both practical and legal significance to the fact that some
alternatives to factorist tests—tests designed according to broader definitions of intelligence—are more predictive of test-takers’ future
academic performance and result in smaller racial differences in test
scores. Correcting for a demonstrated tendency of factorist tests to
make racially skewed errors in assessing admissions-related merit operates to adhere to, not deviate from, academic merit-based admissions. In fact, race consciousness for the purpose of compensating
for test deficiency could be sufficient to establish a legal justification
218
for the explicit consideration of race in selective admissions.
217

218



See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1123–24 (discussing such complaints). In Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Supreme Court ruled that no private right of action
exists to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations. Whether rejected minority applicants may bring Title VI effect-discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—an approach
endorsed by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Sandoval—has not been decided definitively
by the Court. However, even if private enforcement of Title VI regulations is precluded,
individuals are still permitted to file complaints with the U.S. Department of Education
OCR alleging that an institution’s admissions policies have a Title VI discriminatory effect
on the basis of race. See supra note 5.
Universities are uniquely situated, under the Court’s jurisprudence, and have been found
to have substantial academic freedom to develop institution-specific conceptions of admissions-related merit. Rejecting g-centered definitions of intelligence in favor of systems
theories such as Sternberg’s triarchic theory would arguably be within the First Amendment academic freedom of selective universities. Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (“[T]he courts
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A new generation of “more intelligent” standardized tests provides
a potential rationale for affirmative action—the test deficiency rationale—that relies on the traditional conception of merit that has previously been used only to charge that affirmative action is antimeritocratic and unfair. The fact that more refined and more predictive intelligence and college admissions tests result in less racially
disparate impact on minority test-takers opens a path to an outcome
that universities have long characterized as impossible: merit-based
diversity.
C. “Test Deficiency” as Complaint and Defense
Several legal and policy implications stem from universities’ federal constitutional and statutory obligations to avoid racial discrimination in selective admissions. More intelligently designed tests may
generate civil rights administrative complaints alleging Title VI disparate impact discrimination. Rejected non-white applicants can argue
that they would be admitted in greater numbers if tests that were
both more predictive and less racially discriminatory were used. Additionally, these more intelligently designed testing instruments may
provide a new, more enduring legal defense of race-based affirmative
action and may also constitute an empirically supported policy justification for a university’s reliance on non-test score admissions criteria,
such as the non-test score admissions variables often considered as
219
part of holistic admissions policies.
The theoretical framework for this argument is drawn from Justice
220
Powell’s decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and

219
220

below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program . . . .”).
See supra Part I.
The predictive limitations of g-based tests and the traditional factorist theory of intelligence may provide the basis for a new doctrinal approach to affirmative action in higher
education admissions. As suggested by Justice Powell in footnote forty-three to his controlling opinion in Bakke, the need to “cure” inaccuracies in a test’s predictive ability not
only constitutes a compelling interest under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence
but is arguably subject to either intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. In Bakke,
Powell observed:
Racial classifications in admissions conceivably could serve a fifth purpose, one
[not articulated by UC Davis Medical School] . . . : fair appraisal of each individual’s academic promise . . . . To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is no “preference” at all.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43 (emphasis added). Powell’s view is that using race to correct
for test inaccuracies is not a preference. This is essentially an articulation of the test deficiency rationale I identify here.
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echoed by Justice Kennedy in Ricci v. DeStefano : fairness in selection
prohibits reliance on tests that inadequately measure individual testtakers’ merit if better tests with smaller racial differences in scores are
available. The new “test deficiency” defense I propose here could
augment and bolster the “diversity rationale” invoked by selective
universities sued by rejected white applicants alleging their rejection
constituted illegal race discrimination.
Presuming that multidimensional theories of intelligence and college admissions tests will
not eliminate the need for affirmative action altogether, universities
might employ such theories and the decrease in racial disparities associated with such tests to re-shape the affirmative action debate.
This Article articulates the theoretical foundation for the introduction of test deficiency into the doctrinal framework of the Court’s
221

Justice Kennedy’s conclusion in Ricci v. DeStefano that it is permissible to consider race to
increase a test’s overall fairness—such as pre-test administration race-conscious undertaken to design tests that are more fair to test-takers of all races—also supports this conclusion. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009) (holding that, to engage in intentional discrimination, an employer “must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it
will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action”). But see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. 701, 782–84 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that any government use of individual racial classifications
is subject to strict scrutiny). Even if the Court, as is likely given its current composition,
were to take the more probable approach of holding that a university’s consideration of
race to correct for test deficiency does trigger strict scrutiny, a new “test deficiency” rationale for affirmative action in higher education is a plausible alternative doctrinal approach to evaluating the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action in higher education admissions. As has been often true for the current Court, Justice Kennedy’s
position would likely be central to the outcome of a case in which the plaintiffs or defendants relied upon test deficiency.
Although the Ricci case addressed the evidentiary burden employers must satisfy before taking post-test-administration actions to correct for a test’s racially disparate impact,
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci suggests that race-consciousness, if done prior to administration of the test warrants different treatment. See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly
West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 73, 102 (2010) (explaining the Court’s holding in Ricci and arguing that Ricci misinterprets consciousness of race for making hiring decisions directly based on race). In the
Ricci decision, Kennedy suggests that race-conscious action taken to design “more intelligent” tests should be subject to a different, less stringent, standard than raceconsciousness after a “less intelligent” test has been administered. He writes:
Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering before administering a
test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race. And when, during the testdesign stage, an employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair, that process
can provide a common ground for open discussions toward that end.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009). This language may mean Justice Kennedy would potentially endorse race-consciousness for the purpose of designing a test
that “provide[s] a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race,” a view similar to Jusice Powell’s observation that “curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance” is a legitimate justification for considering race as a factor in selection admissions. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43.

June 2011]

INTELLIGENT DESIGN

1291

Fourteenth Amendment constitutional jurisprudence, Title VI statutory disparate treatment analysis, and disparate impact analysis under
Title VI implementing regulations.
Universities that rely on race to correct for the predictive limitations of traditional factorist tests like the SAT could invoke the use of
race to correct for deficiencies in the predictive capacities of the
tests—as a necessary requisite to ensuring fairness in individual competition for selective admission. Social science research demonstrating that new systems-based college admissions tests are twice as predictive as factorist tests like the SAT is the type of empirical evidence
of “test deficiency” that could potentially justify the consideration of
222
race in selective admissions.
1. Title VI Test Deficiency
Rejected minority applicants from racial groups at the low end of
the racial gap in conventional test scores, such as African Americans
and Latinos, may contend that reliance on conventional mental tests
as selective admissions criteria results in unjustified disparate impact
that violates federal civil rights law, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights
223
Act of 1964.
In particular, rejected non-white test-takers who are
members of racial groups at the low end of the conventional racial
test score gap might reasonably take the legal position that the racial
gap in factorist test scores is, at least in part, attributable to the predictive deficiencies of factorist tests as compared to multi-dimensional
tests. Accordingly, such rejected African-American and Latino applicants could file Title VI disparate impact complaints with the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights alleging that racial disparities in admissions rates stemming from the use of admissions tests
premised on a flawed theory of intelligence cannot be justified as an
“educational necessity.”
If new multi-dimensional admissions tests have been empirically
proven to be more predictive with smaller racial differences in test
scores, rejected applicants making Title VI disparate impact claims
may have a decent chance of proving the existence of “less discriminatory alternatives” to conventional factorist tests. Thus, under Title
VI disparate impact theory, proof of test deficiency could expose test
users—selective universities and graduate institutions—to potential
222
223

See id. (stating that racial classifications could serve the purpose of “curing established
inaccuracies in predicting academic performance”).
See generally West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1099 (noting that private Title VI disparate impact complaints can no longer be litigated in federal court after the Sandoval decision).
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224

Title VI disparate impact liability. To immunize and defend themselves against Title VI test deficiency charges by rejected minority applicants and against challenges by rejected white applicants, universities could either begin to use systems-based admissions tests or to
consider race and other non-test scores as factors for the purpose of
correcting the prediction errors that result from reliance on factorist
tests.
2. Reverse Discrimination Equal Protection Challenges
Another implication of this analysis is that universities may have a
promising test deficiency policy justification for adopting admissions
criteria that potentially compensate for the flaws in the intelligence
theory that undergirds factorist tests. Universities have a possible test
deficiency legal justification for correcting for the fact that factorist
tests have been found to have greater racial group differences in
scores than systems-based admissions tests yet do a worse job of predicting the future academic performance of test-takers. Test deficiency is a potential justification for choosing not to rely on tests such
as the SAT or mitigating the extent of that reliance in particular circumstances. In addition, evidence that tests like the SAT have less
predictive power than systems tests, such as triarchic admissions tests
225
designed according to the “theory of successful intelligence,” also
makes it less likely that rejected white applicants can demonstrate
that inconsistent reliance on factorist test scores constitutes “reverse
discrimination” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes prohibiting race discrimination such as Title VI.
Empirical evidence of the scientific deficiencies of factorist tests
weakens race discrimination claims by rejected white applicants who
would otherwise rely on the predictive power of factorist tests as evidence that they posses greater admissions-related merit than nonwhites admitted with lower test scores. A central, though not necessarily explicit, premise of rejected white applicants’ “reverse discrimination” claims is usually that tests like the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and
MCAT are based on sound scientific theory and, as a result, accurate224

225

Title VI disparate impact law requires federally funded educational institutions to justify
the use of admissions tests that have a racially disproportionate impact as constituting an
“educational necessity.” See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. This requirement is analogous to the “business necessity” requirement imposed on employers by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even institutions able to demonstrate an educational
necessity for relying on tests that have a racially adverse impact violate Title VI disparate
impact law if it can be shown that less discriminatory alternative tests are available.
See supra Part III.C.
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ly sort and rank individuals according to their mental ability. The
smaller racial differences in scores on more intelligently designed
admissions tests undermines the scientific credibility of claims that
having a relatively higher factorist test score makes an applicant per
se more deserving—more entitled to selection—than an otherwise
similarly situated but lower-scoring applicant.
As such, the existence of “more intelligent” tests with smaller racial differences in scores shifts the legal terrain in conflicts involving
race and testing. The predictive inadequacies and scientifically unjustified racial differences in scores of conventional factorist tests like
the SAT may be legally cognizable “test deficiencies.” Specifically, I
suggest that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence
and Title VI disparate impact standards may be structured to recognize the concept of test deficiency that is the focus of this Article. It is
on this basis that I assert that modern innovations in intelligence
theory and test development offer an empirical basis for rejected minority applicants to raise the test deficiencies of factorist tests as a legal complaint and for educational institutions to raise the same test
deficiencies as a legal defense in cases where rejected whites allege
reverse discrimination. Hence, modern intelligence research potentially strengthens race discrimination claims by rejected minority applicants who allege factorist tests are “deficient” and weakens race
discrimination claims by rejected white applicants relying on the predictive power of factorist tests to challenge their rejection by selective
226
universities.
D. Impediments to More Intelligent Testing
Nevertheless, it is likely that selective universities will identify numerous potential practical problems and impediments to their adoption and use of more intelligently designed tests in real-world admissions. First and foremost, they may argue that because these tests
have yet to be produced on a mass scale, it is improper to consider
them a less discriminatory alternative under Title VI disparate impact
analysis. In fact, some institutions will also likely point out that there
remains ongoing debate within the intelligence research community
as to how to properly define intelligence and are likely to rely on the
expert opinions of adherents to the g-oriented psychometric view to
criticize newly designed tests as measuring something other than true
intelligence. Institutions might also argue that newly designed tests

226

See id. at 1109–11 (describing test deficiency rationale).
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unfairly exclude and discriminate against certain groups, particularly
227
higher-scoring racial groups like whites and Asian Americans, who,
on average, score higher on conventional factorist admissions tests.
Universities that continue to rely on factorist test scores may also criticize new tests like Sternberg’s triarchic measures for being just as
coachable as, or potentially even more coachable than, conventional
g-oriented factorist tests such that racial differences in scores emerge
on new tests that mirror the racial gaps in conventional factorist test
scores. Another response by selective universities may be to argue
that other scientific research already calls, or may at some point in
the future call, into question the scientific research that is the focus
of this Article—research may challenge whether new tests, like Sternberg’s, are actually better and less racially skewed.
While it is true that any of the above mentioned practical concerns could impact selective universities’ decisions to eliminate their
use of factorist tests or their decisions to adopt new, more intelligently designed tests, the theoretical and legal implications of modern intelligence research are still extremely significant. There are still implications for considering the role of tests in America’s meritocracy
ideology and, even if scientific questions remain unanswered or even
if it is decades before more intelligent tests are operational, I contend
there are current legal implications raised by the scientific insights
arising from the ongoing debate within the field of intelligence research over the accuracy of theories of intelligence and the theoretical underpinnings of factorist g-oriented tests. While other implications warrant exploration, the greater risk of Title VI discriminatory
effect administrative complaints filed by non-white applicants and decreased vulnerability to Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI claims
of purposeful discrimination by rejected white applicants are the central implications of more intelligent tests that I have identified in this
Article.
CONCLUSION
The misuse of mental tests is not inherent in the idea of testing itself.
—Stephen Jay Gould

227

228

228

See, e.g., Kang, supra note 201, at 2–3 (noting that affirmative action usually results to disadvantage Asian Americans who typically score highly on the SAT and other college entrance exams).
GOULD, supra note 93, at 155.
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As our society’s reliance on tests as merit-measuring technology
becomes greater and greater, it is more critical that the law and legal
scholarship consider more than the question that has dominated discourse in the past—when it may be fair to admit an individual with
229
lower test scores over a person with higher test scores. Recognition
of the limitations of the predictive power of tests and theories of intelligence dictating the design of mental tests is rarely considered
outside the field of psychology and, as a result, has been insufficiently
explored within legal discourse. I contend that fairness in selective
admissions requires more than evaluating the fairness of selecting low
scorers over high scorers; rather, it necessitates assessment of the
fairness of the often implicit, sometimes explicit, conclusion that a
higher scorer on a particular mental test has been scientifically proven to be more qualified than a lower scorer on the same test.
The insight of this Article’s analysis provides selective universities
a much-needed theoretical basis for relying on admissions test scores
or for deviating from rank-order selection based on mental test
scores, as well as scientific support for admissions decisions based on
better theories of intelligence. In addition, it offers a response to various accusations of bias in selection—minorities and the poor contend selective admissions are biased in favor of the racially and socioeconomically privileged while rejected applicants of higher-scoring
racial groups and the socio-economically privileged contend selective
admissions is biased against them because it unfairly favors the downtrodden. If institutions fail to adopt new, better, less racially skewed
tests, their continued reliance on g-oriented tests arguably violates
Title VI implementing regulations and encourages Fourteenth
Amendment reverse discrimination equal protection claims of re230
jected whites.
Thus, this project is a first step toward a new interdisciplinary approach to evaluating merit in selective admissions—an endeavor that
has the potential to result in selection that is more fair, at the indi229
230

See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 202, at 300 (noting, in the context of MCATs, that such
tests are imprecise as predictors of academic success).
Racial differences in test scores may persist for some time due to other non-test deficiency
explanations for racial differences in test scores or because new tests are still far from perfect predictors—thereby the real-world need for affirmative action remains. It is also important to note the inherent difficulty faced by institutions that wish to continue to rely
on factorist tests to enhance their institutional prestige rankings. See West-Faulcon, supra
note 5, at 1125–27 (describing incentives to boost “prestige and bond ratings” through
high overall SAT averages). There is a strong argument to be made that universities
should just stop relying on such tests instead of using affirmative action to ameliorate the
impact of reliance on theoretically flawed factorist tests.
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vidual level, and more inclusive to all racial groups. The value of this
interdisciplinary exercise is that it makes it possible to examine the
legal implications of treating mental tests as technology with both
limits in capacity and potential for improvement. It is also a key analytic step in beginning to bring scientifically and empirically supported theories of intelligence and measurement test theory to bear
against the previously unquestioned presumption that admissionsrelated merit aligns in perfect rank-order with higher or lower scores
on conventional factorist tests.
If the predictive limitations of conventional mental tests are due
to inadequacies of g-based factorist theories of intelligence, meritbased selection in selective higher education admissions would be
more fair to individuals if they were assessed based on their scores on
“more intelligent” tests—tests designed according to broader and
more accurate theories of intelligence. Stated another way, selection
231
processes must take into account “test deficiencies” in order to be
fair measures of merit. Under this logic, selection based on strict linear ranking of individuals’ scores on conventional g-based factorist
tests without compensating for the measurement deficiencies of such
tests would, contrary to what is commonly presumed, undermine
conventional merit-based standards.
232
Evidence that traditional g-based factorist tests have been shown
to have less predictive power than newly designed multi-dimensional
tests destabilizes the prior presumption that relying on g-based tests
in selective admissions is the linchpin holding objective standards of
academic merit in place. The interdisciplinary shift I have proposed
in this Article also encourages legal discourse that acknowledges the
need for further innovation in mental testing—more social science
research with the goal of developing tests with increased predictive
power and fewer racial disparities. And, while updated testing technology is being operationalized, this Article offers a doctrinal and
policy framework for evaluating the fairness and legality of relying on
conventional factorist mental tests. Hence, although the central examination of this Article—the implications of scientific improvement
in the intellectual merit-measuring capacity of tests—is not about
race or race discrimination, there are significant racial implications
that flow from this Article’s insights.
It bolsters administrative civil rights complaints lodged by minority applicants contending that reliance on conventional factorist tests
231
232

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.C.

June 2011]

INTELLIGENT DESIGN

1297

is not justified by “educational necessity” as required under federal
233
Rejected non-white applicants, particularly
antidiscrimination law.
African Americans and Latinos, may point to the test deficiencies of
traditional factorist tests as a basis for challenging selective admission
policies under Title VI disparate impact law and offer new systemsbased tests as a more predictive, as well as “less discriminatory alternative,” to traditional factorist tests. Additionally, evidence that tests
like the SAT have less predictive power than tests designed according
to the multi-dimensional “triarchic theory of intelligence” also makes
it less likely that rejected white applicants will allege that inconsistent
reliance on factorist test scores constitutes “reverse discrimination”
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI federal statutes
prohibiting intentional race discrimination. Thus, the combination
of better definitions of intelligence and more predictive tests with less
racially disparate impact on minority test-takers improves the capacity
of selective universities to measure applicants’ admissions-related merit and shifts the theoretical and legal terrain in conflicts involving
race and testing.
Even if selective universities stop short of adopting new standardized tests modeled to measure intelligence more holistically, research substantiating systems theories of intelligence could serve as a
legal as well as theoretical justification for using race and other nontest variables as corrections for the predictive inadequacies of conventional factorist tests like the SAT. If systems-based tests do a better
234
job of identifying the most “successfully intelligent” applicants but
diminish the racial disparity in test scores that has marked factorist
tests historically, rejected non-white applicants and universities may
convince courts that “test deficiency” explains the racial gap in SAT
scores. This means that the long and bitter debate over race-based
affirmative action in higher education may give way to a new generation of dialogue about race, merit, and testing in which racial diversity and merit are not deemed inherently incompatible.
Consequently, a major theoretical implication from this analysis is
that it preserves the concept of meritocracy as attainable by continued innovation in testing—the possibility of more intelligently designed mental tests. Lastly and significantly, this analysis also suggests
an alternative paradigm in which a more racially fair (as well as classfocused) conception of meritocracy may be articulated and eventually
233
234

See West-Faulcon, supra note 5, at 1126.
See The Rainbow Project, supra note 21, at 323 (“Successful intelligence is defined in terms
of the ability to achieve success in life in terms of one’s personal standards, within one’s
sociocultural context.”).
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realized. It opens a path to an admissions outcome selective universities have traditionally argued could not be achieved: merit-based diversity.

